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Figure 1: Relationship between impact assessment, socio-economic assessment and cost-benefit analysis.  
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travel time are too high. There will, of course, always be impacts that cannot be monetised, 
but as long as the analysis captures the most important effects, there is less to gain from 
extensive valuation studies aimed at monetising impacts that are not traded in markets. As this 
monetisation is potentially more confusing than clarifying, non-monetised impacts are 
presented to decision makers on the impact assessment sheet for them to make their own 
personal judgements. Distributional impacts have always been high on the agenda in Norway, 
where politics sometimes take on an almost Rawlsian starting point from which benefits to 
society is measured according to the benefit to those least advantaged. As such, Lichfield’s 
objections could have relevance, but again, CBA has undergone much refinement since he 
offered his points of criticism. Since then, CBA has gone down the road of disaggregation 
where impacts for all groups and regions are specifically discussed. However, and as we shall 
see further below, single-point estimates of NPV/BCR, even if disaggregated, could in worst-
case scenarios misinform rather than inform decision makers of the socio-economic viabilities 
of projects by concealing the inherent risk of a multi-variable model such as CBA. In this 
sense, the planners’ critique represents the main challenge to CBA today, which in our 
opinion is the treatment of risk and uncertainty. 
 
3.1 Profitability measures in cost-benefit analysis 
The aim of CBA is to quantify all benefits and costs associated with a project. The basic 
decision rule of CBA is that a policy is desirable if the following condition holds: 
 
0>− CB           (1) 
 
i.e., accept the project if the benefits generated (B) are larger than the cost of implementation 
and operation (C). However, if some benefits or costs cannot be quantified in monetary terms, 
then the decision rule in (1) can be modified to the “implicit price rule”, which may aid 
decisions. Suppose, for example, that it is impossible to put a monetary value on some 
environmental aspects arising from a policy. If we denote those environmental aspects as E, 
then the basic requirement in (1) could be re-written as the following: 
 
0B C E− − >           (1*) 
 
where E represents the environmental costs that are not measured in monetary terms. If B and 
C are measured in monetary terms, then B - C can be expressed as a monetary total, for 
example $H. The rule in (1*) can further be modified to the following: 
 
 
$ 0;  or simply  $H E H E− > >        (1**) 
 
Approached in this way, we then know that the policy is worthwhile if and only if it is judged 
(by the planner/decision maker) that the net monetary benefits are worth more than the non-
monetised environmental costs. CBA does not therefore require that all costs and benefits 
must be measured in monetary units, but benefit measurement is a necessary part of CBA. 
Incidentally, this approach is similar to the Norwegian method shown in Figure 1, even 
though that similarity may not be emphasised strongly enough. In reality, as costs and benefits 
will accrue over time, discounting is needed to summarise future streams of benefits and costs 
to a single value. The most common evaluation criteria used to discount costs and benefits 
over time are the following: 
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Table 1: Monetised impacts of two project alternatives.
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Table 2: Ranking of projects.  
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4. Risk and uncertainty in transport appraisal 
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Table 3: Main monetised impacts in CBA. 
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4.1 The concepts of risk and uncertainty 
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Figure 2: Probability distributions associated with risk and uncertainty. 
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4.2 The sources of, and consequences of risk and uncertainty 
	
	






	
	

	
	


					
		
	)

	
	(


		>	$

				

	

)					)


%		

		
$







	


	

	

		)

 8$3	

3	"*++*#	


	

		

	<+ 8	)
	*5=
	4D=



	

	"D	
	9+#;
			
	
$%)et al."*++4#	






		

		

	


	)






	

	



(
		
			)

'	

	
				$
	
	
95
	*+=
	5<=
		$
$

	


	


		
		



	


	
	
	0"*++5#	
		

		
	D*+		)
$	


	
	
,?=$$

	
					


	)
@
$	$	






	
"	:<?=
		P9C4=#





	
		

	



			&	0!)

"9??<#	

		9*
		)
$
	
		<=$



"	:9+=
	P9,+=#

		


		




9*


			)	




	
	)
%	
	:		)
$



	


	"6		$9??DE%)$*++<E%)et al.$*++<$*++DEQet al.$
*++D#

	
	

		






$
8)
0"*++?#$	




				
		




	
	

$



	

	
	$



		
$



	


			)
$


	

$
(
	$
	

!

(	
		

		




		)
	
	
"0!)
$9??<E/3	$9??,E/		
$
9???E-2$*++*E-
$*++4E6	et al.$*++4E-

$*++5E-		$*++<EQet al.$*++DE1-$*++DEJ	$*++,E
--'$*++CE-$*++?$*++?EG@$*+9+#'	


	;
		



		)
	
)
	


	
J
	

$
	

						
		
		(
	
	




0

	
	)



			



	)
%	
	)
$


		

		 


	)
$

	)

$	
	)
		

$



		
"9?C?#	


	
		
 !

	)

9?,+9?C+3	

(	
 8	


	)


		
	)
"-
$*++4#G
$
%)"*++,#

	

		


	)
		
	
		
$

			
		


		

	
	
	)

'	
	


	
$
	

	

	;		


		
2
	:	


			
	
$




				



:


		

$
J


	

	


"*++D#$	
	




-
			

	
'
	



	



		
:
 9<

	





	)
	
:



	

$				
	
		


		B#	


	)

$#


	)
	
	$	#
	
	)
"0$*++5#
	



			'-	

$


		)

	

		


	
		
	

	

		;





		
	
	
		;

	)
		
		
$


	

	)

&(
	)

K
L	



		
$
(
	

		
	)
$

	;

	)
	

		

		
"%)et al.$*++4#


	'-


	$
'-
	
	

	
	




	
	
	


	:	:		
	%	
			)
$		

	)


	


	
	$

		
	

		2
		)
"	
	
#
	
	

"$
	#$
		
	
	
"	
	
#	

	
		

	

	
		

$

	
	
		
	


	

4.3 Causes of, and explanations for the miscalculation of costs and benefits 


$
		
	

			

$	

	
	)
	
	

	
			

			


'
et al."*+9+#			

			(
			
	B
$		$
			


Technical explanations	

H		

	
$
$	;

$		
	)
	(
		
	


	
	

(
(
	



	
			
	


%
	
				
	
	


@	$
(
	

				


$

	
		K	
L
			
(
	

Economic explanations

		
$
$

	
		)
		
	)


	
	

	
	
	



		$	)
		




	


	
		



	

	)

	


	%			
$

	

	

	




			)

	

9D
Psychological explanations	
	
		
$
$


		$
	)


	
@	

		
	
			


	
	

		
	:
	

	
	)
$

	
	

		
	
	




	


	

	$"	#

	
	)


	

	$

			
	
	

	


	



	

Political explanations

	
		(
		
	
	
(
			
	'	



$

	


	
		)






	$
	

	$	
			
		
	$		

$	$	
		


		
	%	
)

	
	
	
	
	
	


	
	&

	

	)


	
		;
	$
	

"$$2$9?C,$9?C?E3
	$9??CE%)$*++,$*++,#
	

		


	
	

$

	
			
	

	$		-
%)$



	


	)



$

	

	
%)"*++,#

	
(
	$;


	
		
$	
		
;


	
(
$$	@	$



	

		



	

	

	%)	

	
	


		(
	


	



	
:		(
	

	
&		
	
(
	
	


	

	$
	
	
	
	
@	$



	


		(
			

	$	
(
		
	
	
(
	


	"%)$9??CE
'
et al.$*+9+#

	
:			
	
(
			
	

	

	
		

	0!

"*+9+#$			
	

	$	

	

			

&
(	

	$



	
	
	)
$
		






	$		$
	
only(
			
	
		
	$%)A

				


		

			
K	




L0!


%)A	
			:	
		
	

	
	
	
	(

	
	


	
$
$	

	


	

	)
	

	

	0
	
	



		

		
	$

	
		


 9,
9C
5. Forecast accuracy in Norwegian transport planning 


	
	$	




			
	

		


	

		)

		

	$


	;

	
	
	

	




			


	
	
		;

	
$


		
		)

	
	
J$
	)

		
		)

		

'-		

	(



		

	'-

		


	$
	


	

		
	
		



	

	




	
	

	
	
	:		

	


	
	)
i$
		



	)
$ 
	
$

	
			B
aiX
fiX

aifii XXe           "<#

	
 


	$
 
	

	
&;
	"<#
		
	
		


;
		$

>	 	
	

"0$*+9+#
ie
ie
ie
9*$


	$		B


fifiaii XXXpe H#9++#""         "D#

&;
	"D#

			)
i$
	
	


	
	(
				)
$


	"3&#		B




99
ni
ipen
MPE          ",#

		)	
	


		

	
$


	



		



:		

	$
		
	



	
	0"*+9+#
	
		
	$

	

	"3&#$		
3et al."9??C#B




99
ni
ipen
MAPE          "C#

 9?
3&
	
>	
	
	$
	
	@	$

		
	

	
	


		$

3&3&	



	$

5.1 Construction costs 
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5.2 Traffic 
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Figure 3: Inaccuracy of toll road traffic forecasts. 
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Figure 4: Forecast accuracy in toll-free roads. 
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Figure 5: Inaccuracy of operating cost forecasts. 
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5.4 Concluding comments: Norwegian forecast accuracy 
Forecast accuracy in Norwegian road projects is similar to those that have been presented in 
international studies. Construction costs have been underestimated, traffic on toll-free roads 
has been underestimated, traffic on tolled roads has been overestimated and operating costs in 
toll projects have been underestimated. However, the discrepancies between estimates and 
actual costs/traffic seem to be smaller than experienced elsewhere. For constriction costs, 
there is even a tendency towards cost underrun for large projects. Table 4 summarises the 
results from the available studies of forecast accuracy in Norwegian road projects. Where data 
were available, we also included the mean absolute error as an illustration of the general error 
in the forecasts produced.  
 
The causes for inaccurate forecasts are discussed in detail in Paper 1 and Paper 2, but a 
conclusion worth repeating is that the allegations of bias, with the possible exception of 
operating cost forecasts, find little support in the Norwegian data. 
 
Internationally, the explanations of forecast inaccuracy based on suggestions that transport 
planners are involved in a worldwide conspiracy aimed at lying and deceiving decision 
makers to get projects approved have gained large support. However, if deliberate bias could 
be used as a universal explanation, applicable to different countries on different continents 
over several decades, planning and appraisal frameworks would have to be almost identical, 
but they are not. As shown by Grant-Muller et al. (2001) and Ødegård et al. (2005), there is 
great variation in the appraisal practice throughout Europe (not to mention other continents). 
CBA is the most commonly applied method of appraisal, but there is great variation regarding 
the standardisation of principles and the use of its results. If the results of CBA would be 
decisive for project approval, it could indeed give project promoters an incentive to lie. 
However, as suggested by Næss et al. (2006), if planners have no incentive to lie, the 
tendency to exaggerate benefits is reduced. And as discussed in Section 3, in the Norwegian 
case, projects with high estimated social benefits are not necessarily more likely to receive 
funding than others, which could be an explanation as to why bias seems less prevalent here 
than suggested elsewhere. We do not have data to assess if this is also the case in other 
countries, but in our view, the model proposed by Flybjerg (2007b) and outlined in equation 
(10) is too simplistic. 
 
Underestimation of costs 
+ Overestimated benefits        (10) 
= Project approval  
 
Osland and Strand (2010) also opposed Flyvbjerg’s conclusions and argued that he lacks the 
data to verify his conclusions. To conclude that it is the most misrepresented projects that are 
selected for implementation, data on both selected and rejected projects are needed. That data 
has not been included in Flyvbjerg’s research. Furthermore, in a sample of several hundred 
projects, there might be other explanations overlooked by Flyvbjerg that could help explain 
the observed inaccuracies.  
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6. Addressing risk in transport appraisal 
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6.2 Expected value analysis 
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Figure 6: Probability distributions of benefits and costs. 
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6.3 Probability analysis 
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9# Develop a model: identify output and input variables
*# Identify uncertainty: specify possible values with probability distributions of the input 
variables
4# Analyse the model with simulations: values are selected randomly within the specified 
ranges of values
5# Make a decision
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Figure 7: Probability distributions in a Monte Carlo simulation. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of results: net present value. 
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6.4 Risk management in Norwegian cost-benefit analysis 
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7. Concluding remarks and recommendations for the future 
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Do Planners Get it Right? The Accuracy of Travel 
Demand Forecasting in Norway 
Morten Welde1 
Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Oslo, Norway; Norwegian University of Science and 
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This paper deals with the accuracy of travel demand forecasts among Norwegian road projects. We 
use data collected from tolled roads and toll free roads. The results reveal that while traffic forecasts 
of tolled schemes are fairly accurate, traffic forecasts among toll free roads have a higher degree of 
inaccuracy and are generally underestimated. An explanation for the observed discrepancy between 
estimated and actual traffic among toll free roads is that road planners may have ignored the 
existence of induced traffic and that the standard national traffic growth rates used in the transport 
models has been too low. For tolled roads, an explanation for the higher degree of forecast accuracy 
is that planners over the years have been scrutinized to provide careful estimates. Our 
recommendation is that traffic forecasts provided by planners should constantly be subjected to 
scrutiny by independent consultants before being presented to the decision makers. Aspects that 
need to be specifically examined include: (1) the extent to which a road project may lead to induced 
traffic, (2) the extent to which transport models accommodate appropriate factors and, (3) the extent 
to which forecasts made address uncertainties by providing confidence intervals of estimates. 
 
Keywords: Traffic-forecast accuracy, toll roads, toll free roads  
 
1. Introduction 
Risk and uncertainty are issues of increasing concern in transport planning, and it is generally 
acknowledged that inaccurate travel-demand forecasts represent a major source of risk in the 
planning of infrastructure projects. International experience suggests that bias, or deliberately 
skewed forecasts, may play a role in the planning of road-infrastructure projects and that risks are 
often downplayed. 
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The over- or underestimation of traffic levels can have severe implications. Traffic forecasts are used 
to determine the capacity of transport infrastructure, and inaccurate traffic forecasts can therefore 
result in inefficient and inaccurate sizing of the road. Accurate forecasts are also important from a 
socioeconomic point of view. All road projects in Norway and most other countries of Western 
Europe are subjected to traditional cost-benefit analyses, which rely heavily on the accuracy of the 
forecasts being used. If traffic levels turn out to be significantly lower than estimated, this can affect 
total benefits derived from time savings, reduced accidents or lower vehicle-operating costs. In the 
case of traffic underestimation, the capacity relief on the congested links could turn out to be lower 
than planned. This may distort the social viability of such projects and result in non viable projects 
being implemented. The end result may be inefficient resource allocation. 
For toll projects, the implications of inaccurate forecasts are even more serious. Whether a road 
project can (completely or partly) be financed using tolls or not depends largely on the traffic level 
(i.e., the number of paying vehicles). Thus, in addition to the consequences for toll free roads, toll 
roads on which traffic levels fail to meet expectations also risk financial default. Furthermore, toll 
roads are often financed through non-recourse loans that are secured against future toll revenue only 
and with no other collateral. Bondholders and lenders should therefore require proposed toll roads 
to be subjected to a thorough risk assessment before investing in projects where the repayment of 
loans relies on precise traffic estimates. 
Over the years, several toll projects have experienced financial difficulties due to traffic shortfalls, 
cost overruns and/or increased interest rates. The Ålesund Tunnels project in Norway experienced 
payment difficulties soon after opening in 1987, and the main creditor, Sunnmørsbanken, eventually 
collapsed. Despite a restructuring of the loans, the project was, in effect, bankrupt. The debt 
continued to increase, and when the project finally was terminated in October 2009, the remaining 
debt was still some € 165 million, which had to be covered by the government. To date, however, it is 
the only Norwegian toll project that has gone into default. With over 100 projects financed by tolls, 
the success rate of Norwegian tolling must hence be considered high. Internationally, the Hungarian 
M1/M15 represents a well-known example of overestimation. The project opened on time and 
within budget, but the traffic soon turned out to be only about half of what was projected. As the 
concessionaire relied solely on the traffic revenue, guarantees from both the shareholders and the 
state had to be drawn, and eventually, the concession was nationalised and toll rates halved. The 
shareholders suffered substantial losses and received no compensation (Joosten, 1999). More 
recently, the M6 toll road outside Birmingham, UK, is now being used by less than half the number 
of vehicles for which it was intended, and haulers have called for the road to be subsidised to ease 
congestion on the main M6, which has no tolls (BBC, 2008). 
The aim of this study is to provide new evidence on the magnitudes of traffic forecast inaccuracies 
using Norway as a case study. We provide explanations for the accuracies and inaccuracies and, 
based on these explanations, give recommendations for improving road-forecast practices. The 
differences in the forecast accuracies between toll and toll free road projects are specifically 
examined.  
The paper is organised into the following sections. Section 2 discusses the forecast uncertainties on 
toll roads versus toll free roads. Section 3 presents the data and methodology used in the analysis. In 
Section 4, the results are presented, and in Section 5, some conclusions are drawn. 
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2. Forecast inaccuracies for toll roads vs. toll free roads 
The practice of financing new infrastructure through user fees is increasing worldwide. For roads, 
cost recovery through tolls is becoming ever more common as total tax revenues are often 
insufficient to cover the requisite infrastructure investments. Traffic forecasting is a complex issue, 
and adding tolls to the calculation normally increases the uncertainty of the forecasts. Road users 
respond to tolls in various ways, not all of which are rational, and the models used to forecast traffic 
are not necessarily designed to incorporate these reactions. 
The financial viability of a toll project relies heavily on the number of paying vehicles passing 
through the toll stations, and overestimation of traffic can potentially have severe financial 
implications. Thus, it is expected that planners treat toll projects with a higher degree of caution and, 
even if uncertainties in the estimates cannot be eliminated, use conservative traffic estimates to avoid 
overly optimistic forecasts. 
Forecast inaccuracy is not necessarily a problem. If the errors for various projects are randomly 
distributed around the true mean, there is a possibility that they would cancel each other out for a 
given project portfolio. When the forecasts are systematically biased, however, with averages 
significantly different from zero, perhaps due to over optimism or downright dishonesty on the part 
of the planners, the problem should be taken more seriously. Whereas transport models can be 
improved through increased computing power, improved data quality and other factors, deliberate 
human error is much harder to completely avoid. 
The concept of optimism bias or risk denial has been the focus of several studies by Flyvbjerg (2005) 
and Flyvbjerg et al. (2005, 2006). Based on the data from transport projects around the world, the 
authors concluded that planners in the transport industry do a poor job of estimating demand. For 
roads, the actual traffic was found to be, on average, 9.5% higher than forecasted. The actual and 
forecasted traffic differed by more than ± 20% in over half of the road projects in the sample. Based 
on these rather disappointing results, Flyvbjerg suggested that planners and decision makers should 
take traffic forecasts, especially rail forecasts, which do not properly deal with uncertainty with “a 
pinch of salt” (Forster, 2006, p. 9). Furthermore, Flyvbjerg used these results to make allegations 
regarding the professional honesty (or dishonesty) of the planners and argued that the end result 
was often that the most misrepresented projects were built rather than the best ones (Flyvbjerg, 2007). 
This was opposed by Osland and Strand (2010), who found no general support for the theory of 
strategic misrepresentation and argued that there are other mechanisms at work that could better 
help to explain the variations in the forecast accuracies that were often observed. 
It is often assumed that planners have become better at predicting traffic levels due to improvements 
in transport models and computing power. Flyvbjerg et al. (2006) did not support this proposition. In 
fact, the opposite seems to be the case for Danish road projects, as forecasts there seem to have 
become more inaccurate over time. Odeck et al. (2009), however, reached different conclusions. By 
investigating the accuracies of the national and regional traffic forecasts, they found that the forecasts 
have become more accurate since 2001, when the regional and national transport models were 
improved. Although their findings relate to forecasts at the macro- and regional levels rather than 
project-specific forecasts, it is still of interest to compare their results with ours.  
Traditionally, the studies of forecast accuracy have been based on toll free roads. With the use of toll 
financing increasing, however, toll projects have come under increasing scrutiny, especially from 
credit-rating agencies that routinely gauge the financial viability of such projects on behalf of 
potential investors. Perhaps the first comprehensive study of toll road traffic-estimation performance 
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was conducted by the investment bank JP Morgan (1997), revealing that 13 of the 14 newly 
implemented US toll roads displayed traffic levels below forecasts. In four of the projects, the 
opening-year traffic was 30% below what was expected. The bank concluded that traffic-forecasting 
inaccuracy represents one of the major sources of risk in toll road projects. The credit-rating agency 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) have performed risk studies of the traffic forecasts in toll projects since 2002 
(Bain and Wilkins 2002; Bain and Plantagie 2003; Bain and Plantagie 2004; Bain and Polakovic 2005) 
and reported consistent findings. Their conclusions were that toll projects throughout the world 
suffer from extensive optimism bias and error. The performance of the projects studied ranged from 
actual traffic being only 15% of the forecasts to actual traffic exceeding forecasts by more than 50%. 
From the perspective of potential investors, these results are alarming. Even worse, it is likely that 
Standard and Poor’s sample, like the other samples of misleading forecasts, was biased because the 
toll facilities with a higher credit quality were over-represented. The worst cases of traffic 
underestimation were probably not included in the sample. As stated by Bain and Polakovic (2005, p. 
68): ‘(…) very poorly performing assets will remain under-represented in the sample and the results 
derived from our case studies are likely to be flattered in comparison with average, global toll road 
forecasting performance’. Forecasts for complex road schemes with intricate traffic patterns are hence 
likely to be vague or non existent, making follow-up studies more difficult. 
The concept of demand ramp-up is often considered to be an argument against using the first whole 
year of operation as the basis for measuring the inaccuracy in forecasts because the demand for travel 
often depends on variables that might take years to spread through the system. It may thus take a 
few years before a new road reaches its full traffic potential. In the S&P 2005 study, however, Bain 
and Polakovic (2005) investigated the concept of demand ramp-up and found no such effect, as there 
was no systematic improvement in the traffic forecasting accuracy after Year 1. The underestimation 
of the traffic in Year 1 was likely to persist during Years 2-5, meaning that the forecasts did not 
become more accurate over time. Similar conclusions were reached by Fitch Ratings (George et al., 
2003), who found the actual performance in US toll projects to be heavily skewed downward. 
However, unlike the other studies mentioned above, George et al. found clear evidence of ramp-up 
and that traffic tended to gravitate back towards and even exceed the original forecasts over time. 
Given these rather disappointing results, one might ask why the toll-financing share of total road 
financing annually increases if traffic revenues regularly fail to meet expectations in the first critical 
years of operation. A probable reason is that a high proportion of user-financed projects actually do 
meet expectations. Mauchan and Bates (2007), of the transport-planning consultants Steer Davies 
Gleave (SDG), studied 15 privately funded toll projects and found that the forecasts showed a 
distribution around the expected value, with no evidence of optimism bias. In fact, for the majority of 
the projects, the traffic was within 5% of forecasts, which in many ways is extraordinarily accurate. 
Their sample was small, however, and even included seven shadow-toll projects, making them, in 
effect, toll free projects, so the transferability of the results may be limited. Users do not pay at the 
point of use in shadow-toll projects, and including such projects in a toll road sample could be 
considered dubious. However, Bain (2009b) argued that shadow-toll projects share the same error 
characteristics as traditional toll projects because of the private financing mechanism. The SDG study 
showed, however, that no general conclusions can be drawn regarding the accuracy of traffic 
forecasts for toll roads and that research in the industry would benefit from a more case-specific 
approach, focusing on one country or region at a time. However, the general impression of toll-
project forecasting accuracy is of overestimation. Further examples from the US, Spain and Australia 
(TRB, 2006; Vasallo, 2007; Li and Hensher, 2009 – cited in Bain, 2009b) have all suggested consistent 
over optimism and/or optimism bias of toll road traffic forecasts. 
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Studies of forecast accuracies in toll roads versus toll free roads have been rare to date. However, 
Bain (2009a) provided a comparison of toll and toll free roads based on the data from the S&P studies 
referred to above and the sample presented in Flyvbjerg et al. (2005). The comparison showed that 
the toll roads and toll free roads suffered from the same uncertainties. The forecast distributions for 
the two categories of roads were similar (the same error) but centred around different means; this is a 
sign of potential bias. The traffic on toll roads was found to be generally lower than the forecast, 
whereas the traffic on toll free roads was found to be higher than the forecast. The consequence of a 
similar distribution is that the observed bias can be corrected for, and the potential for error and 
economic losses can be reduced. Thus, there is no evidence to support the theory that forecast error is 
reduced when drivers are not required to pay tolls. Næss et al. (2006) reached the same conclusions 
with similar forecasting accuracy in terms of the absolute error between the two classes of roads.  
The studies cited above show that while traffic on ordinary road projects often turns out to be higher 
than the forecast, toll road traffic is generally overestimated. What these studies have in common 
though, is that the data often have been collected from secondary sources and from different 
countries on different continents. Some observations even date back decades. Given that different 
countries inevitably have different planning traditions and tools and place different emphasis on 
forecasting accuracy, we argue that the conclusions reached should be interpreted with care. A data 
set from one country and one data source only would, in our opinion, yield much more reliable 
results due to the greater opportunity for quality control of the data. Accordingly, the focus of this 
study is the accuracy of travel-demand forecasts for Norwegian road projects. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data for this study consisted of observations from 25 toll projects and 25 toll free road projects in 
Norway. The data from toll projects are often more available and generally of better quality than for 
other road projects because all toll projects require a specific approval from the Norwegian 
parliament. The parliamentary bill in which the project is presented includes all financial 
assumptions, including the forecasts for the average annual daily traffic through the toll stations. The 
critical test for traffic forecast accuracy is thus how the actual traffic relates to what was presented to 
decision makers at the time of the decision to build. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration 
(NPRA) collects data annually on the traffic levels, costs and revenues in all toll projects throughout 
the country. The data set includes 12 fixed-link crossings (bridges and tunnels), 11 ordinary highway 
projects and 2 toll cordons. The tolling in the projects started in the years 1990 to 2007. In projects 
where the traffic patterns were difficult to forecast, the data are often unavailable. This is consistent 
with the sampling bias that was observed in the studies mentioned above. 
Although our sample consisted of relatively few observations, we still consider it to be representative 
of the population. During the years 1990 to 2007, 33 toll projects were implemented. Thus, our 
sample comprised 76% of the total projects in the analysed period. The criteria on which the 
sampling was based were data availability and quality. We acknowledge that using the projects 
where data was not available or of a sufficiently high quality for inclusion in the data set would 
increase the precision in the various property estimates of the population. However, due to the high 
sample/population ratio and the fact that the quality of the observations was considered to be very 
high, we still expected to be able to draw some valid conclusions regarding the accuracy of the 
forecasts in the Norwegian toll road industry. 
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An important distinction between toll projects and toll free projects is that paying traffic will always 
differ from (and be lower than) ordinary traffic because of various discounts and exceptions. 
However, given that the information on the fare and discount system was known before the start of 
the project, we still expected planners to be able to estimate their effects with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy.  
For the toll free projects, the data situation was somewhat more complicated. Although these projects 
are approved by parliament in the same way as the toll projects, less data are presented to the 
decision makers, and the quality of post opening data are generally less reliable. However, the 
parliamentary bill includes the net present value (NPV) estimated in the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
that relies heavily on the forecasted traffic levels. To find the original estimates, we thus had to 
consult the original CBAs in which the NPV estimates presented to the decision makers were found. 
The previous CBAs were not stored in a single database, and even when the estimates were present, 
they were often on an overall level, so access to the original detailed calculations was necessary. In 
the Norwegian case, impact assessment, including CBA, is carried out by use of the EFFEKT 
software. This was a rather demanding process and required collecting data from several sources. 
The next step was determining the actual traffic. The NPRA collects traffic data from 9,000 sites on all 
roads based on permanent and temporary monitoring. Among these, 600 sites are so-called Level 1 
sites where the traffic is counted continuously. Unfortunately, no system is in place that requires 
traffic data to be automatically collected on new roads. This means that traffic data were not 
available for several new roads and could not be included in our data set. We were nevertheless able 
to find 25 toll free roads where both reliable estimates and actual traffic levels were available. The 
data were from the years 2001 to 2007 and consisted primarily of projects outside the major urban 
areas. We often found that less emphasis was placed on traffic forecasts for small road projects such 
as the straightening of curves. The sample thus consisted mainly of larger projects. 
3.2 Methodology 
To estimate the accuracy of the traffic forecasts, we compared the actual traffic with forecasted 
values: 
ffa XXXU H#9++#""   
where U is percent inaccuracy, aX is the actual traffic and fX is the forecasted traffic. With this 
estimation, perfect accuracy is indicated by zero, and for example, -20% would imply that the actual 
traffic was 20% lower than expected. For forecast values, we used the estimated traffic in the first 
calendar year of operation. This is normally presented in the parliamentary bill where the decision to 
approve the project is made. This means that if a project opens for traffic in August, the basis for 
comparison would be January to December the next year. In addition, we examined Years 3 and 5 to 
test whether any improvement in the forecast accuracy occurred over time. One might argue that 
focusing merely on the first year of operation does not allow for the long-run nature of many 
forecasting models. However, the principles of discounting suggest that the first years of operation 
are crucial for both financial and social viability. If a toll project with a pay-off period of 15 years fails 
to meet revenue expectations in the first five years, the risks of default increase considerably, even if 
the forecasts become more accurate in, for example, 8–10 years. 
It is probably unreasonable to expect planners to be able to predict values with perfect accuracy, 
especially for projects with complex traffic patterns. However, no acceptable level of forecasting 
accuracy is defined, and it must thus be regarded as an empirical matter. For construction costs, the 
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Ministry of Transport and Communications requires cost estimates to be in the range of ±10%; with 
no specific requirement for demand-forecast accuracy, we used this as a benchmark and regarded the 
demand estimates that were within ±10% of the actual traffic to be within an acceptable range. 
4. Results 
The purpose of this study was to assess divergences between the forecasted and actual traffic for toll 
and toll free projects and to investigate whether there were differences in the forecast accuracies for 
the two types of projects. In this section, we present the results of our findings.  
4.1 Forecast accuracy: Toll roads 
As with the international studies referred to above, we found the forecasted traffic on Norwegian toll 
projects to be higher than the actual traffic. However, with the actual traffic being 2.5% less than 
forecasted on average, the scale of overestimation was much less than that revealed in the studies in 
other parts of the world. Summary statistics for the forecast inaccuracies with the Norwegian toll 
projects are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary statistics for forecast inaccuracies for toll roads. 
  Statistic 
Number of cases 25 
Mean -2.5 
Std. error of mean 4.4 
Standard deviation 22.0 
Minimum -35.2 
Maximum 45.0 
 
These results appear to be encouraging. A mean of -2.5% was well within what we defined as an 
acceptable range. However, a closer look at the data revealed that a majority of the projects 
experience traffic overestimation, as in the international studies reported above. Additionally, 24% of 
the projects had over 20% less traffic than expected. Clearly, a traffic overestimation of up to 35% in 
the first whole year of operation can potentially have severe financial implications for the viability of 
a project. There is a significant risk that projects with traffic shortfalls of this magnitude could 
experience financial difficulties that necessitate loan refinancing, a prolonged payment period, 
increased tolls or a combination of alternatives. Luckily, the Norwegian economy has been blessed 
with the rare combination of high economic growth and low interest rates for some time. If this were 
to turn into a recession with increasing interest rates and demand shortfalls, as seen in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the risk of default would increase considerably. The standard deviation was 22%, 
indicating a rather large variation between the projects. Table 2 provides the distribution of projects 
by percentage inaccuracy.  
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Table 2. Distribution of projects by percentage inaccuracy. 
  Number of projects Percentage 
Projects with overestimation larger than -20% 6 24.0 
Projects with overestimation 0 to -20% 10 40.0 
Projects with underestimation 0 to +20% 5 20.0 
Projects with underestimation larger than +20% 4 16.0 
Total 25 100.0 
 
A histogram showing the distribution of these observations is provided in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Inaccuracies of the toll road traffic forecasts. 
 
Figure 1 reveals a curve that is close to a normal distribution. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 
normality (D(25) = 0.159, p > 0.15) confirmed that the forecasts for the traffic levels in the Norwegian 
toll projects were normally distributed around the mean or that the assumption of a normal 
distribution was not rejected. A t-test for deviation from zero revealed a test statistic of -0.57 and a 
significance value of 0.58, which meant that the mean forecast inaccuracy was not significantly 
different from zero and that we could not conclude that the underestimation was more common than 
overestimation for the Norwegian toll roads. 
From a credit perspective, it is worrying that the majority of the forecast errors for Norwegian toll 
projects were overestimations. However, a toll project can sometimes struggle to reach its full traffic 
potential in the first whole year after opening. This could potentially mean that the overestimation is 
more severe in Year 1 than in subsequent years and that the traffic better fits the forecasts as time 
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progresses. The international evidence of ramp-up has been inconclusive, as different studies have 
shown different results. However, as shown in Table 3, even though the number of observations 
decreased over time (N = 22 in Year 3 and N = 19 in Year 5), there were signs of ramp-up in the 
Norwegian toll projects.  
Table 3. Demand ramp-up. 
Year since opening Mean inaccuracy Std. dev. 
Year 1 -2.5% 22.0% 
Year 3 -2.1% 20.0% 
Year 5  2.3% 23.2% 
 
Although the traffic in Year 1 was overestimated, it increased over time, and after five years, the 
average traffic exceeded the original forecasts. Although the financial implications of forecast error in 
Year 1 might be severe, there is less need to worry if the traffic soon increases to or even exceeds the 
necessary levels. This is contrary to Bain’s (2009b, p. 37) claim that “…projects that under perform in 
their early years may never catch up with their original forecasts in later years”. In our sample, 
among the 13 projects with an overestimation greater than the sample mean, four exceeded their 
original forecasts, five exhibited traffic growth that may well soon put them in the above-forecast 
figures and four continued to under perform at Year 5. From a financial perspective, the failure to 
meet revenue predictions in the first five years of operation is, of course, potentially alarming, but 
our results nevertheless provide a more nuanced picture than that painted by Bain.  
4.2 Forecast accuracy: Toll free roads 
For the toll free roads, for which we had 25 reliable observations from the last nine years, we noted 
that the traffic was, on average, higher than forecasted. The mean underestimation was 19.0%, but the 
range was large, from -14.6% to +76.1%. This was consistent with the pattern observed by Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2005) and Næss et al. (2006). Only six projects had traffic levels below the forecasts, and 13 
projects exhibited traffic overestimation above the sample mean. In seven projects, the actual traffic 
was over 30% higher than predicted. This is clearly unacceptable. We would expect the forecast 
accuracy to be higher for toll free roads, but this was not the case for the Norwegian roads. The 
picture that emerged was that the traffic forecasts for the toll free Norwegian roads were skewed to 
the right. The summary statistics for the toll free roads are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary statistics for the forecast inaccuracies for toll free roads. 
  Statistic 
Number of cases 25 
Mean 19.0 
Std. error of mean 4.1 
Standard deviation 20.5 
Minimum -14.6 
Maximum 76.1 
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Despite a high standard deviation, we found that the mean was significantly different from zero at 
the 99% level (t(24) = 4.64, p < 0.05). Thus, we concluded with a high level of certainty that the traffic 
on toll free Norwegian roads has been underestimated. The spread in the distribution was 
alarmingly high, which indicated a high level of general error. The shape of the distribution, as 
illustrated in Figure 2, indicated that the observations were normally distributed around the mean 
but with a slight positive skew (Kolmogorov-Smirnov: D(25) = 0.098, p > 0.20). 
As illustrated by the standard deviations for both classes of roads, the internal variations with both 
the toll and the toll free projects were huge. However, the difference in the means between the two 
categories of roads was -21.5, and a t-test of the difference revealed that the difference in the mean 
forecast accuracy between the two categories was highly significant and not a result of coincidence 
(t(48) = -3.58, p <0.01). 
 
 
Figure 2. Forecast inaccuracies for the toll free roads. 
 
4.3 Do planners get it right? 
Our results suggest that the Norwegian transport planners should not be satisfied with the accuracies 
of their forecasts. On average, the planners do not get it right even if the toll road forecasts were, on 
average, within an acceptable range. Here, the results presented by Flyvbjerg (2005) and Bain (2009a) 
were confirmed because the toll road forecasts were more accurate than the forecasts for the toll free 
roads and because the countries with more toll road experience produced more accurate forecasts. 
However, the ranges that both the toll roads and toll free roads forecasts fell within were alarmingly 
high and should be a cause for concern. 
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The traffic on toll free roads was significantly higher than forecasted. This is worrying and would be 
doubly disturbing in a situation where the road capacity was limited and where the motivation for 
new road construction was to relieve congestion. But this is usually not the case in countries where 
the congestion is still limited to the peak-period traffic in the large cities. The higher traffic levels will 
often, as argued by Kjerkreit and Odeck (2009), lead to a higher NPV than originally estimated. 
However, this is obviously not a satisfactory situation in the long term. If the traffic is generally 
underestimated, then this could lead to inefficient resource allocation or the implementation of the 
wrong projects and a shorter relief period from congestion for the roads in urban and congested 
areas.  
Transport models for the Norwegian roads sector have improved since 2001, when regional transport 
models replaced a wide range of locally developed models, and Odeck et al. (2009) claimed that the 
forecasts have since improved. Today, the traffic on ordinary toll free roads is estimated through the 
use of national transport models for trips longer than 100 km and regional transport models for trips 
shorter than 100 km. Both models are traditional four-step models based on the fixed-trip matrix 
approach. Induced traffic is thus not taken into account. The traffic on toll roads, however, is 
estimated using elasticity models where the effects of tolls are calculated specifically. Hence, there 
are two different models used, one for toll roads and one for toll free roads.  
The use of the regional transport models has made it possible to identify the factors that lead to 
inaccurate forecasts. If the distributions of the forecasts between regions are similar, it is easier to 
isolate the cause of the error if the forecasts have been based on the same models than if different 
models have been used. Thus, it was interesting to test whether the assumption of increased accuracy 
after the introduction of regional transport models holds true using the data to which we had access. 
The toll road sample included 13 projects implemented in the years 1990 up to and including 2000 
and 12 projects implemented in the years 2001–2007. For the toll free roads, we had 13 projects from 
2001 to 2004 and 12 projects that opened for traffic in the years 2005–2007. Table 5 shows the 
differences in the mean accuracy for the two time periods for the two road categories. The number of 
observations is so low that caution should be taken when interpreting the results, but there appears 
to have been little or no improvement in the forecast accuracy over time either for the toll roads or 
for the toll free roads. However, the weaknesses in the Norwegian transport-demand models were 
first identified in the work leading up to the National Transport Plan for the years from 2002 to 2011, 
and because the planning process for roads often takes years, it has not been until very recently that 
we can expect to see real improvements caused by the improvements in the transport models. 
Table 5. Traffic-forecasting inaccuracies over time. 
Road category/opened for traffic Mean inaccuracy 
Toll roads 1990–2000 -2.7% 
Toll roads 2001–2007 -2.2% 
Toll free roads 2001–2004  18.6% 
Toll free roads 2005–2007 19.4% 
  
The concept of induced traffic is often used to explain traffic levels in excess of what was originally 
predicted. A study by Goodwin (1996) found the traffic in 151 UK highway schemes to be 10% higher 
on average than the forecasts in the short term and 20% higher in the long term. Thus, the forecasts 
for these projects were not able to fully include the extra traffic created by the network 
improvements leading to retiming, redistribution, mode shifting or change of frequency. Goodwin 
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also suggested that the addition of the capacity itself, regardless of the changes in the travel time, 
could help explain the increases in traffic flow. However, the changes in traffic brought by the 
improvements in the pleasantness of travel, such as a smoother ride from better surfaces, remains an 
under-researched area (Goodwin and Noland, 2003).  
Traditionally, transport planning has been based on the traffic levels and independent of the supply 
conditions and the quality of the road network. The growth demand has been largely attributed to 
economic factors such as income, population growth, the prices of petrol and other input factors. 
This is normally referred to as the fixed-trip matrix approach and is still in use in Norwegian road 
planning (except for the straight-crossing projects). Because the traffic on toll free roads is generally 
higher than forecasted, there are indications that this approach should be abandoned and that the 
induced traffic should be dealt with explicitly.  
Another potential explanation for higher traffic levels than estimated is the long period of economic 
growth that Norway has experienced over the last decade. Because transport is a derived demand, 
forecasting traffic relies on the forecasts of a range of other parameters (Boyce and Bright, 2003). 
Thus, if the income estimates in the transport models are underestimated, traffic may also be 
underestimated. The same pattern was observed during the 1990s, when the average national traffic 
growth over the years 1992–2002 was higher than all the forecasts that had been produced (Larsen et 
al., 2004). The recession early in the decade was followed by an economic boom that was 
accompanied by strong traffic growth. De Jong et al. (2003) distinguished between input uncertainty, 
or difficulties in producing good forecasts for transport model input variables, and model 
uncertainty. Because Norway has experienced unprecedented, strong economic growth over the last 
decade, there are clear indications that while more emphasis has been put on improving the 
transport models, the main causes of the observed error are input error rather than model error. This 
fits well with the observations of Larsen et al., who found the standard national traffic growth rate, 
which has been a mandatory input in the transport models, to be too low. 
Strategic behaviour and bias are often cited when no other explanations for forecast inaccuracy can 
be found. Wachs (1987, 1989) argued that because planners are concerned with having their projects 
financed and built, they deliberately produce overly optimistic forecasts for both capital costs and 
traffic. Because governments operate under budget constraints, the projects compete with each other 
for funding. Planners could thus be tempted to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits to 
meet a specific benefit-cost ratio (BCR) cut off. Although intuitively appealing, we do not necessarily 
agree that this serious allegation can be used as a general explanation for traffic-forecast inaccuracy. 
First, our results showed no evidence of such behaviour, which in itself was an indication that these 
forces are not occurring in Norway. Second, as the traffic on ordinary roads was underestimated, the 
benefits were also underestimated and not overestimated, all other things being equal (Kjerkreit and 
Odeck, 2009). In uncongested conditions, traffic in excess of what was forecasted will increase the 
overall benefits, and planners will thus have little to gain from underestimating the traffic, as this 
would mean presenting projects with a lower NPV than what they later turn out to produce. In fact, 
the funding for Norwegian road projects does not always rely on a positive BCR at all. Odeck (1996, 
2010) studied whether Norwegian decision makers’ ranking of road projects was explained and/or 
positively influenced by a positive BCR. Contrary to expectations, he found that the BCR was not a 
significant explanatory variable for the selection of projects and that more emphasis was placed on 
non monetised impacts. The projects with a positive BCR were sometimes not put on the priority list 
at all, whereas the projects with a negative BCR were sometimes given a very high ranking. Nilsson 
(1991) found similar results in Sweden. Although clearly unsatisfactory from a socioeconomic point 
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of view, placing less emphasis on socioeconomic profitability and monetised impacts could reduce 
the risk of optimism bias in producing the traffic forecasts. 
We do acknowledge, however, that the bidding process by which the toll road contracts are awarded 
may play a role in explaining the optimism bias. As argued by Flyvbjerg (2005), Vasallo (2007) and 
Bain (2009b), awarding toll road contracts based on a bidding process where the bidder with the 
highest revenue projections or the lowest capital cost projections wins could reward over optimism 
rather than accuracy. Here, the Norwegian framework for toll financing provides an alternative 
framework that might reduce the risk of overoptimistic forecasts. Norwegian toll projects are 
initiated locally, usually because much-needed road investments cannot be realised in the near future 
within the government budget. The proposal is then evaluated by the NPRA, who closely scrutinises 
all major assumptions before it is forwarded to the Ministry of Transport, which prepares a bill to be 
tabled in Parliament. The project might have a positive or a negative NPV, but all toll projects are 
stress-tested for financial robustness to ensure that the risk of financial default is low, even in worst-
case scenarios. Once passed by Parliament, the operation of the toll road is managed by a non profit 
toll company operating as a financial vehicle on behalf of the NPRA, which remains the ultimately 
responsible party for the project (for a detailed presentation of the organisational framework of 
Norwegian tolling, see Welde and Odeck, 2009). Although the system is not without its flaws, there 
is less incentive for appraisal optimism than in alternative frameworks, and the system of quality 
control and the emphasis on conservative estimates has so far prevented any major financial scandals 
in the Norwegian toll road industry. 
The absence of any major scandals due to inaccurate traffic forecasts should not, however, lead us to 
conclude that this is not an area that warrants continuous attention. The huge variation in  
forecasting accuracies continues to be a major source of risk in the planning of Norwegian road 
projects. However, merely pointing out the problem will not make it disappear. The increasing range 
of international studies focusing on this issue has apparently not contributed to any major 
improvements in terms of forecasting accuracy. However, the knowledge generated from studies 
such as this will hopefully facilitate learning and lead to improvements in the forecasting 
methodologies. Furthermore, we strongly suggest that that the fixed-trip matrix approach (i.e., 
assuming a zero elasticity of demand) be abandoned for all road projects, as this is very likely a cause 
of the poor estimation of traffic levels and, ultimately, total economic benefits. In addition, because 
the process of project bidding or requiring projects to pass a certain BCR threshold to receive 
financing clearly increases the risk of deliberate over optimism, a system where NPV/BCR is only 
one input variable in the decision-making process should be considered. It would be interesting to 
see if countries that apply alternative appraisal frameworks, such as Multi-Criteria Analysis suffer 
from the same inaccuracies as countries where the decision makers’ preferences are more determined 
by the outcome of the traditional cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the signs of good practices should act 
as encouragement and as an incentive for further research into why some projects are more 
successful than others. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we examined the accuracy of traffic forecasts made in the Norwegian road sector. Two 
types of road projects were studied and compared: (1) toll roads and (2) toll free roads. This 
distinction was made because the consequences of inaccuracy with toll projects are considered to be 
more serious because they may lead to financial difficulties and the bankruptcy of toll companies. 
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We found that the traffic forecasts in the Norwegian toll projects have been fairly accurate. A likely 
explanation is that the planners over the years have been scrutinised and pressed to provide careful 
estimates for these projects. The results prove that the planners have been careful, but the number of 
projects where the actual traffic was significantly below what was forecasted suggest that the toll-
project traffic forecasts should continue to be closely scrutinised. However, the variation in the 
forecast accuracies was high, and we suggest that the results from this study be used to identify the 
causes of why some projects have performed better than others. For the toll free roads, the results 
showed a clear underestimation of the traffic. Some of the projects studied had underestimations so 
great that there is reason to suspect that the projects may have experienced induced traffic for which 
the planners failed to account. This underestimation may have lead to inefficient resource allocation. 
Thus, the decision makers may have been misled into foregoing projects that were beneficial in 
favour of less beneficial ones.  
The results from the Norwegian road sector are slightly better than some of those presented in 
studies from other countries, especially for the toll roads, where the actual traffic was, on average, 
very close to the forecasted traffic. Even though the number of projects with traffic levels 
significantly different from the forecasts was high, the mean forecast accuracy and the relatively high 
share of projects with traffic levels close to perfect accuracy is a source of some encouragement.  
Our findings should be of interest to planners and policy makers in Norway and elsewhere. First, the 
planners need to reconsider their traffic-forecasting models, at least for the toll free projects, to ensure 
that all relevant factors are captured and forecast inaccuracy thus reduced. Second, the issue of 
induced traffic in particular must be considered. The Norwegian models for traffic forecasts do not 
consider induced traffic explicitly, and this may well be a reason why underestimation is prevalent. 
Third, with the high uncertainty revealed in such a crucial variable as the traffic level, presenting 
decision makers with single-point estimates for the NPV might potentially be misleading. This 
suggests that the presentation of social surplus through the NPV should be done through a 
confidence interval illustrating the inherent uncertainty in a project evaluation. Finally, the care taken 
when estimating traffic in toll projects demonstrates good practice but, even here, there is a potential 
for improvement. 
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a b s t r a c t
This article presents the effects of removing the Trondheim toll cordon, which was closed after nearly
15 years of operation on December 31, 2005. The trafﬁc levels, measured as vehicles per hour, in 2006
are compared to trafﬁc levels in 2005. The evaluation also covers the effect on the retail market and
possible environmental effects. We also seek to investigate what the trafﬁc levels would have been
today if the cordon had still been in operation. We ﬁnd that the closing of the Trondheim toll cordon has
lead to increased trafﬁc levels in the peak hours, with an average increase of 11.3% in the former
charging hours of 06:00–18:00. On an average, the hours between 14:00 and 18:00 experienced an
increase in trafﬁc of 15.5%, whilst trafﬁc in the evenings and nights decreased. Model results suggest
that the removal of the toll cordon has caused the private car to increase its modal share at the expense
of passengers per car, public transport and cycling/walking. The increase in the total number of trips
would have been more uniformly distributed among the alternatives if the toll cordon had still been in
operation.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Congestion and emissions represent some of the most serious
challenges that European cities face today. This affects the quality
of life for the people living and working in the cities, and
represent substantial costs to society. Road user charging is thus
increasingly suggested as a possible solution to these problems,
either as traditional tolls to ﬁnance new infrastructure or as more
sophisticated demand management schemes designed to relieve
congestion and to improve the environment.
Norway was among the ﬁrst countries to implement cordon
based charges, and Trondheim was the third Norwegian city to
implement this method of ﬁnance. The Trondheim toll cordon,
comprising 12 unattended toll stations, was opened in October
1991 and was later upgraded into a more sophisticated zonal
based system and where 60% of motorists in the city paid tolls
regularly. Even if the purpose of the cordon was mainly ﬁnancial,
there was an element of price differentiation, with trafﬁc only
being charged on weekdays during the hours 06:00–17:00, and
tag holders having smaller discounts during morning peak hours
(06:00–10:00) than during the rest of the day. The revenues were
earmarked for road investment within the city with a smaller
share being allocated to infrastructure for public transport
(mainly bus lanes) and facilities for walkers and cyclists. In total,
some 70% of the revenues in the Trondheim investment package,
in which tolls contributed to 47% of the funds, was spent on
planning and building roads, while some 20% was invested in
public transport and various ‘‘soft measures’’. The remaining 10%
was spent on establishing and operating the toll stations.
The Trondheim scheme was unique in three aspects when it
was introduced in 1991: (i) it was fully electronic with non-stop
toll lanes from the start, (ii) it had time-differentiated charges
supporting trafﬁc management objectives, and (iii) every single
crossing had to be paid for, but subject to a maximum limit of one
chargeable crossing within an hour and 75 chargeable crossings
per month. The one-hour-rule always applied, but the monthly
limit was later changed to 60. The toll level was initially set
at NOK 10 for ordinary vehicles (o3.5 tonnes) equalling
approximately 10% of an average hourly rate for Norwegian
industrial workers at the time. For tag holders, discounts of up to
60% were offered. Over the years, various aspects of the scheme
were revised, such as the number and location of charging points,
operating hours (extended to 18:00 h in 1998), contract options
and toll levels. In 2005, the toll was NOK 15.1 As more than 90% of
the vehicles were equipped with tags, the average toll was only
some NOK 8 after discounts. Fig. 1 shows the layout of the scheme
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at its last year of operation, then comprising 24 stations and
59 payment lanes. The main characteristics of the 2005 scheme
are summarised in Table 1.
The cordon was considered a success as it contributed to
ﬁnance much needed infrastructure that would otherwise not be
available. Although never popular among the motorists, negative
attitudes soon decreased after the cordon opened and the
advantages of it became clear. In fact, the most favourable
measurement of public attitudes was from the summer of 1992,
the ﬁrst full year of operation when 37% of the respondents were
positive to the cordon and 35% negative. An opinion poll from the
autumn of 2005, the last year of operation, showed 19% positive
attitudes and 47% negative. This poll was in line with a trend of
decreasing public support since 1992, following two major
expansions of the scheme (Tretvik, 2006). The diminishing
support seems in part to be an effect of lack of continued
information about the purpose of charging. When respondents in
2005 were reminded about what projects the income from
charging had ﬁnanced, the positive share increased to 30% and
the negative share decreased to 38%. Interestingly enough,
Fig. 1. The 2005 Trondheim charging scheme.
Source: eMap, Trondheimskartboka. Statens kartverk/Trondheim kommune. SKST-16/2001.
Table 1
Main characteristics of the Trondheim toll cordon.
Characteristic Trondheim toll cordon
Population of Trondheim 160,000
Average annual daily trafﬁc
across the cordon
82,000
Number of toll stations 24
Period of operation Mon–Fri, 06:00–18:00
Mode of operation Automatic lanes for tag holders, coin machines
and two stations with attended toll booths
Percentage tag holders 94%
Standard toll rates (NOK
light/heavy vehicles)
15/30
Discount for tag holders
06:00–10:00
20–40%
Discount for tag holders
10:00–18:00
40–60%
Gross revenues per year
(NOK)
235,000,000
Operating costs per year
(NOK)
25,000,000
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responses were 48% positive and 27% negative to a similar
question in 2006 about attitudes to having had urban charging in
Trondheim (Tretvik, 2007a).
It might seem difﬁcult to understand why such a successful
measure for ﬁnancial and for potential trafﬁc management
purposes was removed, but the reasons can mainly be found in
the organisational framework of Norwegian toll ﬁnancing. All toll
projects, whether cordon based or as single link projects, are
approved by local authorities and by the Parliament for a limited
period of usually up to 15 years. It is as such a contract between
the politicians and the voters, a contract that the former is
normally reluctant to break. The politicians in Trondheim had
therefore made a strong commitment that after 15 years of
operation, the cordon should be removed.
This article deals with trafﬁc effects after the cordon was
removed in 2005 and proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an
overview of what effects tolls have had elsewhere. Section 3
examines the data and methods used in the study, while Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 presents elasticity estimates and in
Section 6 some conclusions and policy implications are offered.
2. The impacts of road user charging
2.1. Trafﬁc impacts
When planning transport projects, and projects which involve
charges at the point of use in particular, accurate travel demand
forecasts are of vital importance. Experience suggests that
inaccurate travel demand forecasts represent a major source of
risk in the planning of infrastructure projects. Knowledge of how
motorists react to the introduction of tolls is thus crucial for a
variety of reasons. Tolls are generally used to ﬁnance new
infrastructure and/or to manage demand. Precise estimates of
trafﬁc levels are thus clearly important for both of these purposes.
Failing to understand how road users will react when generalised
costs are changed due to tolls can thus have severe implications
for the dimensioning of transport infrastructure and for the
ﬁnancial and social viability of projects.
Whereas traditional toll charging to ﬁnance new infrastructure
has been around for decades, urban charging schemes are still few
and far between. Despite the efforts of the European Union, the
OECD and transport economists throughout the world, urban road
user charging is still considered to be a radical and controversial
policy (Niskanen and Nash, 2008). Therefore, knowledge of user
reactions to charges in an urban environment is limited.
After the Area Licensing Scheme in Singapore was introduced
in 1975, it was not until 1986 that a cordon based charging
scheme was implemented in the Norwegian city of Bergen. This
was soon followed by cordons in Oslo in 1990 and Trondheim in
1991. The Norwegian toll cordons were all introduced mainly to
raise revenue to ﬁnance new roads, and tolls were set so as to
maximise revenues without acting as a major trafﬁc deterrent.
However, a moderate effect on trafﬁc was expected. In Bergen and
Oslo, the number of car trips decreased by some 6–8%, following
the introduction of the cordons (Larsen, 1995), while Trondheim
experienced a decrease of around 10% (Meland, 1994). In recent
years, the London congestion charging scheme and the Stockholm
congestion tax have received considerable attention and provided
valuable new empirical results. The London scheme, introduced in
2003, was probably the ﬁrst urban charging scheme since
Singapore and was introduced solely to manage trafﬁc demand.
As trafﬁc was reduced by almost 30%, this conﬁrmed that users do
respond to tolls and that congestion charging probably is one of
the most potent measures for reducing trafﬁc congestion and
emissions. Similar results were found in the Stockholm conges-
tion charging trial in 2006, which saw trafﬁc reductions in the
order of 20–25%. Although a trafﬁc reduction in line with model
estimates, the most groundbreaking feature of the Stockholm
scheme was the later land-slide change in the public opinion
towards tolls and the subsequent permanent implementation in
August 2007 (Eliasson et al., 2009). Today, minor and limited
schemes are in operation in cities such as Durham, Milan, Rome
and Bologna, while the list of cities considering or planning to
introduce charging schemes is on the increase (for a comprehen-
sive state of the art review of urban road user charging, see May
et al., 2009).
There is an increasing range of studies covering user responses
to changes in prices or income. Amongst these are Graham and
Glaister (2004) and Goodwin et al. (2004), both of which
ﬁnd transport demand to be fairly inelastic to changes in prices
and income. The results presented in these reviews conﬁrm
previous ﬁndings presented by, amongst others, Oum et al. (1992)
and Goodwin (1992).
Although the literature on transport elasticities is extensive,
there is a limited number of studies available covering toll
elasticities speciﬁcally. Odeck and Bra˚then (2008) have thus
recently provided an overview of toll elasticity studies from toll
facilities throughout the world. They ﬁnd that most of the studies
reveal elasticity values around 0.5, implying that an increase in
generalised costs of 10% (holding other variables constant), due to
an increase in tolls will lead to a 5% reduction in trafﬁc. All studies
show that the elasticities are larger in projects with high tolls and
where an untolled alternative exists. Furthermore, long-run
elasticities are generally found to be higher, and sometimes even
up to 2–3 times higher, than short-run elasticities. The reason for
this is that travellers are more able to adjust to price signals
through relocation, job-change, car ownership, etc. in the long-
run than in the short-run.
The majority of these studies do, however, deal with situations
where tolls have been introduced. The effects when tolls are
removed have rarely been documented. The study by Odeck and
Bra˚then (2008), referred to above, includes 13 Norwegian toll
projects where elasticities have been calculated after the tolls
were removed. They ﬁnd the average short-run elasticity where
tolls have been removed to be 0.70, ranging from 0.03 to
2.26. The motorways in their sample have stable elasticities
around 0.45, while rural roads have the largest spread. It is
worth noting that the latter group includes the projects with the
highest tolls. The authors hence ﬁnd that tolls and elasticities
are correlated and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Elasticities are higher in schemes with high tolls. With regard to
the difference between short- and long-run results, the
long-run elasticity is found to be on an average 1.6 times
the short-run elasticity and that the adjustment period was
relatively short with most of the demand adjustment taking place
within a year.
Even if the number of road user charging schemes is on the
increase, toll cordons are still few and trafﬁc effects, due to the
introduction or removal or cordon tolls has rarely been docu-
mented. Urban road user charging is still relatively uncommon,
but the U.S. provide some examples. Bridges and tunnels in the
New York area have been subjected to tolls for decades and here
Hirshman et al. (1995) have found the median toll elasticities to
average 0.1. This is similar to ﬁndings from the San Francisco
area (Harvey, 1994). In Singapore, Luk (1999) and Menon (2000)
have found car travel to be inelastic to tolls reporting values of
0.19 to 0.58 and 0.12 to 0.35, respectively. A more recent
example is represented by the London congestion charging
scheme, where Santos and Shaffer (2004) report elasticities
between 1.32 and 2.10. Transport for London’s own calcula-
tions has given an elasticity value of around 1.6 (Evans, 2007),
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while Peirson and Vickerman (2008) estimates the elasticity to be
0.82. The generally high elasticities found in London are
probably due to high charges and a wide availability of public
transport. The well documented effects of the Stockholm conges-
tion charging trial of 2006 also includes estimates of elasticity
at around 0.8 for private car trips across the cordon (Eliasson
et al., 2009).
2.2. Effects on the local economy
Urban road user charging remains a controversial issue. Of
particular concern are potential adverse effects on the local
economy, and especially the effects on retail trade located within
the charging zone. Although the literature on the impacts of urban
road user charging on the retail trade sector is scarce,
research from London and Stockholm has provided us with some
knowledge.
The London congestion charging scheme is notable for its high
charges, where ordinary vehicles pay some EUR 9 to enter the
charging zone. This has lead to a considerable decrease in the total
number of car trips, and it is not unreasonable to expect some
negative impacts on the local retail market. Despite this, Quddus
et al. (2007) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact on the retail sector as a
whole. However, negative impacts for the John Lewis store in
Oxford Street were found to be statistically signiﬁcant.
This is consistent with the reporting of Transport for London (TfL),
which concludes that there is no general evidence of any
measurable impact from the central London congestion charging
scheme on business and economic activity (TfL, 2008).
The Stockholm congestion tax system is more sophisticated
with greater time differentiation of charges and no charge on
evenings, nights, Saturdays and Sundays, public holidays and the
day before such holidays. Today, even the whole month of July is
exempt from payment. This means that the effects on an average
disposable income is small, around one-tenth of a percent,
(Eliasson et al., 2009) and evaluations indicate that the system
has not affected retail revenue, neither in shopping malls nor in a
sample of retail stores (Daunfeld et al., 2009).
The evidence provided in this section show that tolls do affect
trafﬁc levels. The impact on the local economy, on the other hand,
is likely to be limited. Whether or not a charging scheme is
introduced to manage demand or to ﬁnance new infrastructure,
tolls will reduce trafﬁc. The magnitude of the impacts depends on
the size of the toll and the availability of alternatives in terms of
other routes, destinations, modes of transport and/or time of
day/week to carry out the desired travel activities. The literature
provides elasticity estimates following introductions of tolls in
urban areas and removal of tolls in rural or semi-urban areas.
Moreover recent evidence from London and Stockholm indi-
cates that effects on business and the local economy are likely to
be limited. There are, however, no comprehensive studies of
effects following the removal of an urban road user charging
scheme. The time-differentiated charging scheme in Trondheim
was introduced primarily to raise revenue, but also to achieve
better utilisation of capacity in the transport network. This
paper presents ﬁndings from the evaluation of the effects,
following the removal of the cordon. Of special interest is to
study if motorists have changed their trip timing back towards
the pre charging hours, and whether the removal of the cordon
has had an effect on overall trafﬁc levels or not. Tolls in
Trondheim were low, but made considerable contributions to
transport investment. Evaluating the effects of removing the
Trondheim toll cordon could thus help to determine if low and
relatively uncontroversial tolls could also be an efﬁcient trafﬁc
management tool.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Trafﬁc impacts
The data from this study is based on available trafﬁc counts
from 2006 for all the former toll stations sites. When charging was
discontinued at the end of 2005, the vehicle counting equipment
at all toll stations was maintained in operation for at least three
months. Automatic counting was kept running for six months at
ﬁve stations, and for the whole of 2006 at only two charging
points. This enabled trafﬁc changes between 2005, the last year
with tolling, and 2006, the ﬁrst year without tolling, to be
compared hour by hour and day by day (Tretvik, 2007b). In order
to control for seasonal variations, an average daily trafﬁc for
each month in 2005 and 2006 was calculated. Because of the
time differentiation of the charges, an average daily trafﬁc was
split into the following subsets: Monday–Friday 06:00–18:00,
Monday–Friday outside 06:00–18:00, Saturdays and Sundays. In
total, trafﬁc was registered in all the former charging points and
the Ranheim toll station, which is still in operation—in total 61
lanes in 25 toll stations. The revenues from the Ranheim toll
station are ﬁnancing the E6 East motorway project.
3.2. City centre trade
The basic source of data for being able to study changes in city
centre trade is the VAT register managed by the Norwegian
Central Bureau of Statistics. Sale ﬁgures are distributed by an area
in the city, according to location of shops and businesses. This
makes it possible to study development in trade by year and
geographical location. The local Chamber of Commerce has
collected these data annually since 1987, and provides a source
for comparing market shares in different parts of the city—some
affected by the toll cordon and others are not.
3.3. Transport model
Although trafﬁc counts in 25 toll stations provide good insight
into changes in trafﬁc levels after the cordon was removed, it does
not provide us with information on changes in the overall trafﬁc
levels, mode use and geographical trafﬁc patterns in the
Trondheim area. To get indications of the magnitude of such
effects, the strategic transport model for Trondheim (TASS5) has
been used to simulate the transport situation in the area with and
without the charging scheme in operation. The TASS model, which
is implemented in the CUBE system, has been developed to
support local transport policy decision-making, and has been used
to analyse effects of various road user charging schemes over the
two decades with RUC in Trondheim. TASS is a network
equilibrium model for passenger transport, based on the tradi-
tional four-step principles, but includes hierarchical choice
models for simultaneous choice of mode and destination for the
‘‘dynamic’’ trip purposes (mainly trips not related to work and/or
school). The model is based on local data describing transport
supply and demand in the Trondheim area, and all parameters in
the choice models are derived from data from local travel surveys.
de Palma et al. (2006) discuss challenges in modelling urban
road pricing. Their paper is mainly based on the MC-ICAM
research project of the European Commission, and present
ﬁndings from ﬁve case studies involving ﬁve different modelling
tools for ﬁve different road pricing schemes in ﬁve different
European cities. Although none of the combinations of RUC
schemes and modelling tools in these case studies are directly
comparable to that of Trondheim, it is likely that the conclusion
they draw from their study, is valid for the Trondheim case too:
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‘‘there is clearly a considerable gap between an idealised
approach, and what is feasible in applied modelling work using
large-scale empirical network models (p. 100)’’. This gap is
probably smaller for the car driver option than for the alternative
modes included in the model. Data describing factors affecting the
demand for these modes and good quality data to calibrate the
models is much harder to come by than similar data for the car
alternative. This may, among other things, affect the ability of the
model to represent the competition between the alternative
modes, and thus the magnitude of changes for each of these
modes as a consequence of the measures studied. Albeit these
shortcomings, the network model for Trondheim has been used
and developed for RUC-related analyses for over more than two
decades, and during this process the model has proved its
relevance for these topics.
3.4. Energy consumption
The total energy consumption for passenger transport in
Trondheim has been calculated for each of the modelled
alternatives, using rough ﬁgures for an average energy consump-
tion per person-km with motorised road transport alternatives
(car and bus). The following key ﬁgures have been used as basis
for the calculations (Andersen, 2001):
 Car with one person/vehicle: 0.55 per kWh/person-km.
 Bus with 25% occupancy rate: 0.30 per kWh/person-km.
 Bus with 50% occupancy rate (normal occupancy): 0.15 per
kWh/person-km.
In TASS5, the weekday is divided into four periods:
1. Evening and night, 18:00–06:00.
2. Morning, 06:00–09:00.
3. Mid day, 09:00–15:00.
4. Afternoon, 15:00–18:00.
The energy consumption for private cars is estimated based on
the key ﬁgure for energy consumption per person-km for a vehicle
with one person per vehicle, and the calculated number of vehicle
kilometres from the model. For public transport, there is no
information available about the true occupancy rate for the peak
and off-peak periods. As a proxy, it is assumed that there is a 50%
occupancy rate during the peak (time periods 2 and 4), and a 25%
occupancy rate outside the peak (time periods 1 and 3). These bus
occupancy rates are assumed to include empty running related to
the operation of the bus service. Thus, the energy consumption for
public transport is estimated based on key ﬁgures for energy
consumption per person-km for bus in and outside the rush hours,
and the calculated number of public transport person-km within
each or the four time periods in the model.
4. Results
4.1. Trafﬁc changes 2005–2006
A result for typical local trafﬁc is shown in Fig. 2 for three
stations located along the main bypass road (Moholt, Nardo and
Nidarvoll, see Fig. 1 for their locations). These stations were
chosen for further analyses because they were fairly typical for
local inbound trafﬁc within the city, and they were among the few
stations for which it was possible to retrieve data for a continuous
six month after-period. Whilst trafﬁc in these stations increased
by 12% during the formerly charged periods of Monday–Friday
06:00–18:00, trafﬁc for the whole week increased by only 4%, and
trafﬁc at working day evenings and at weekends decreased. This
shows that motorists that were priced out during the charged
periods have returned back to the more preferred periods for
making trips. Looking at percentage of trafﬁc within charged
hours for working days, this increased from 73.9% in 2005 to
76.5% in 2006. This indicates that a considerable shift has
occurred, in relative terms, back to hours of the day that were
formerly charged.
Fig. 3 provides evidence that some drivers in 2005 started early
to avoid being charged. Trafﬁc in 2006 between 05:00 and 06:00
decreased by 11%, whilst trafﬁc between 06:00 and 07:00
increased by 11%. It seems that drivers were no longer deterred
by the tolls that had started at 06:00. In the afternoon, shifts in
departure times to avoid being charged are even more evident.
The last of the charged hours, between 17:00 and 18:00, had a
20% increase in 2006, compared to an 8% decrease in the following
hour.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows that the increase in volumes for working
days was largest in the afternoon, smaller during the middle of
the day and smallest in the morning. This may at ﬁrst glance seem
surprising, considering that charges were higher in the morning
hours 06:00–10:00 than later in the day (see Table 1). However,
the reaction from the motorists is associated with a large share of
rather inelastic work, school and business trips during 06:00–
10:00 (69%), compared to only 17% during 10:00–14:00 and 9%
during 14:00–18:00. Thus, the progressively larger increases
during the day can be explained by a corresponding larger share
of private trip purposes, having a larger elasticity of demand with
respect to the choice of departure time.
Trafﬁc entering the city from the east, is clearly affected by the
fact that the Ranheim toll plaza (see Fig. 1) is still in an operation.
When the charging stations in the toll cordon were removed,
motorists were able to make detours using routes that were now
free of charge, to avoid passing through Ranheim. The result had
considerable increases between 2005 and 2006 at places like
Skovga˚rd (48% for charged periods and 25% for average daily
trafﬁc) and Tunga (20% for charged periods and 16% for an average
daily trafﬁc), and corresponding decreases at Ranheim (17% for
charged periods and—11% for an average daily trafﬁc). It should
be noted that charging at Ranheim was at a ﬂat rate 24 h a day,
7 days a week. It is unlikely that this rerouting would have
affected trafﬁc in any other stations than Skovga˚rd and Tunga.
Some of the stations that came into operation close to the city
centre during the last expansion of the charging system were also
affected by route change adjustments. Considerable increases in
trafﬁc levels at these stations in 2006 indicate that motorists returned
back to preferred routes which they had been priced out from using.
On the whole for the Trondheim charging system, trafﬁc in the
formerly charged periods Monday–Friday 06:00–18:00 increased
much more than trafﬁc during other periods of the week between
2005 and 2006 (see Fig. 5). For all the former toll stations, trafﬁc
increased 11.3% between 06:00 and 18:00, while the other parts
of the day experienced no trafﬁc increase at all. The trafﬁc
increase for the week as a whole was just 2 percentage points
above the general trafﬁc growth in the county in 2006. The
removal of the Trondheim toll cordon thus did not lead to a
dramatic increase in total trafﬁc. Only for stations located at the
southern part of the municipality did the termination of charging
lead to trafﬁc increases that were higher than the general growth
of trafﬁc in the county.
These results are interesting compared to what happened
during the ﬁrst year of operation of the original Trondheim toll
cordon. The evaluation from that time (Meland, 1994) showed
that during 1992 inbound car trafﬁc through the cordon
decreased by 10% during both the high and low charged periods.
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The toll cordon caused a general shift in timing of car trips away
from the charged hours, but the percentage reduction was not
affected by the differentiation between peak and off-peak charges.
This decrease in trafﬁc was offset by increases in an inbound car
trafﬁc in evenings and at weekends. Thus, over the week as a
whole, total trafﬁc volumes across the toll cordon were virtually
unaffected by the charging. For some trip purposes like an
inbound work-home and home-shopping, there were substantial
shifts away from the charged afternoon period to the uncharged
evening period.
When charging was terminated at the end of 2005, trafﬁc
impacts were in many ways mirror images of the impacts, when
charging was introduced in 1991. Changes in departure times and
route choices were the most visible responses to the termination
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of charging by car drivers. In general, the Trondheim charge levels
were modest, but trafﬁc still displayed sensitivity to tolls.
4.2. Effects on the city centre trade
Prior to implementation of the 1991 charging scheme, there
were concerns about negative effects on the attractiveness of the
CBD for business activity, and great uncertainty prevailed about
the possible effects on shopping trips. During the ﬁrst months of
1992, there was evidence of some businesses located inside the
toll cordon losing trade. However, from the summer of 1992, no
distortion of competition due to the toll cordon could be read out
of the statistics. Businesses located in the CBD had prior to the toll
cordon predicted major negative swings in trade once the cordon
came into operation. The Chamber of Commerce in its own study
concluded that there was hardly any effect of the cordon on the
CBD trade at all. Fig. 6 shows what happened to CBD retail trade in
relation to other areas in the municipality since the turn of the
century. A long term trend of decreasing market shares has
continued, even though the net sales volumes have grown
modestly. However, the market share did not drop during 2005,
and the drop during 2006 was smaller than in previous years. Still,
the removal of the cordon did not lead to an upswing in city
centre trade during 2006. Thus, it can be concluded that the often
expressed concern that city centre trade will suffer from urban
tolling, cannot be supported by the evidence from Trondheim.
4.3. Overall changes in transport patterns, 2005–2006
In this section, results from the modelling of three alternatives
are presented: the situation in 2005 with the tolling system in
operation (2005), a scenario for 2006 with tolling (2006WT) and
the situation in 2006 with no tolling (2006NT).
Factors causing changes in transport demand in these analyses
are changes in the transport system – namely removing the toll
charging – and growth in population and labour-market from 2005
to 2006. The comparison of 2005 and 2006WT thus gives the effects
of the demographic and work-related changes, while the compar-
ison of 2006WT and 2006NT isolates the effect of removing the
charging. Finally, comparison of results from 2005 and 2006NT gives
the total calculated effects, caused by changes in population, labour-
market and the charging being ended. If nothing else is stated, the
latter results are the ones commented in the following.
As shown in Table 2, the car driver alternative represented
almost half of the trips in 2005, and with the charging being
brought to an end, the share is estimated to have increased
further by 3.1 percentage points in 2006NT, mainly at the expense
of the car passenger and slow mode alternatives.
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Due to the increase in population, a 2% increase in total
number of trips is expected (Table 3). Due to the removal of the
toll cordon, shares of other modes than car are estimated to have
decreased. The number of trips by car increased by 8%, mainly at
the expense of car passenger trips, but also trips by public
transport and pedestrian/bicycle are estimated to have decreased
slightly. Due to the increase in trafﬁc levels, especially during the
peak periods, the overall average speeds by car decreased
somewhat in the alternative 2006NT. Coupled with the increase
in the number of trips, this lead to a 15% increase in vehicle time.
The modelling results indicate that if the cordon had still been in
operation (comparison of 2005–2006WT), the 2% increase in total
number of trips would have been more uniformly distributed
among the alternative modes.
4.4. Resulting changes in energy consumption
The main purpose of the road user charging scheme in
Trondheim was to raise revenue to ﬁnance new infrastructure.
However, for many new urban RUC schemes, concerns about
environmental issues are an important part of the motivation.
The Trondheim evaluation therefore includes a rough estimate of
changes in energy consumption as a consequence of the termi-
nation of the charging scheme.
The total energy consumption for passenger transport in
Trondheim has been calculated for each of the three alternatives
modelled, as described in Section 3.4.
For 2005, the total energy consumption for passenger trans-
port in Trondheim is calculated to nearly 1900 MWh per day. For
the 2006NT alternative, there is an increase of 7–8% to 2000 MWh
(Table 4). The energy consumption levels per hour are highest
during the afternoon peak period. For this time of day, the
increase in total energy consumption is estimated to 10%, with
172 MWh per hour in 2005 and 189 MWh per hour in 2006NT.
The increase in an energy consumption by passenger cars is 8%,
and for buses, almost no change. While public transport is used
for some 13–14% of the person-km by motorised transport, it
represents only 7–8% of the total energy consumption for local
person transport in the Trondheim area. The removal of the
Trondheim toll cordon has thus led to a 4% increase in energy
consumption per person-km in the area.
Table 2
Mode distribution Trondheim municipality; 2005, 2006 with tolling (2006WT) and 2006 with no tolling (2006NT).
Mode Alternative Change
2005 (%) 2006WT (%) 2006NT (%) 2005–42006WT 2006WT –42006NT 2005 –42006NT
Car driver 49.6 49.9 52.7 +0.2%-points +2.9%-points +3.1%-points
Car passenger 8.6 8.7 7.0 +0.1%-points 1.7%-points 1.6%-points
Public transport 10.4 10.4 10.0 +0.1%-points 0.4%-points 0.4%-points
Pedestrian/bicycle 31.4 31.0 30.2 0.3%-points 0.8%-points 1.1%-points
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 3
Transport indicators for working days Trondheim municipality; 2005, 2006 with tolling (2006WT) and 2006 with no tolling (2006WNT).
Mode Change
Alternative 2005–42006WT 2006WT-42006NT 2005-42006NT
Unit 2005 2006WT 2006NT Absolute Relative (%) Absolute Relative (%) Absolute Relative (%)
Car driver
Trips 297,751 305,137 323,040 +7386 +2 +17,903 +6 +25,289 +8
km 3,155,730 3,251,480 3,414,216 +95,750 +3 +162,736 +5 +258,486 +8
min 4,626,557 4,818,557 5,317,183 +192,000 +4 +498,626 +10 +690,626 +15
Car passenger
Trips 51,685 53,203 42,857 +1518 +3 10,346 19 8828 17
km 510,530 532,742 417,609 +22,212 +4 115,133 22 92,921 18
min 682,942 719,059 565,575 +36,117 +5 153,484 21 117,367 17
SUM car driver+passenger
Trips 349,436 358,340 365,897 +8904 +3 +7557 +2 +16,461 +5
km 3,666,260 3,784,222 3,831,825 +117,962 +3 +47,603 +1 +165,565 +5
min 5,309,499 5,537,616 5,882,758 +228,117 +4 +345,142 +6 +573,259 +11
Public transport
Trips 62,320 63,916 61,498 +1596 +3 2418 4 822 1
km 570,411 592,276 570,582 +21,865 +4 21,694 4 +171 +0
min 832,316 862,879 831,999 +30,563 +4 30,880 4 317 0
Pedestrian/bicycle
Trips 188,048 189,753 185,144 +1705 +1 4609 2 2904 2
km 521,271 530,018 513,186 +8747 +2 16,832 3 8085 2
min 6,255,252 6,360,216 6,158,232 +104,964 +2 201,984 3 97,020 2
Total
Trips 599,804 612,009 612,539 +12,205 +2 +530 +0 +12,735 +2
km 4,757,942 4,906,516 4,915,593 +148,574 +3 +9077 +0 +157,651 +3
min 12,397,067 12,760,711 12,872,989 +363,644 +3 +112,278 +1 +475,922 +4
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5. Elasticity estimates
The responsiveness of demand to changes in factors affecting
the level of demand is normally measured through the concept
of elasticities. Elasticities measure the change in one variable due
to a change in an another variable. The level of demand for car
travel is affected by the generalised costs, which could be
assumed to consist of variables such as travel time, vehicle
operating costs and tolls. Other costs could also be included, such
as the value of accident risks and insurance costs, but these are
considered to be of negligible magnitude for car trips in
Trondheim, which on an average are just above 10 km long. The
extent to which travellers take time costs into account or if small
time savings/increases affect travel choices are debatable. The
increase in an average travel time in Trondheim from 2005 to
2006 was just 55 s or 6%. To account for this uncertainty,
elasticities based on generalised costs, both with and without
time costs are calculated.
Several measures could be used to calculate elasticities, with
the most common ones being the point elasticity and the arc
elasticity (for a full discussion of elasticity measures, see TRL,
2004). The point elasticity is used to express the effect on demand
from marginal changes in price, while the arc elasticity is used for
larger price changes as it assumes a convex demand curve which
is generally regarded as a more appropriate approximation to the
true demand curve.
For estimating the elasticity of demand due to the removal of
the Trondheim toll cordon, the average generalised costs for car
travel in Trondheim is needed. As the charging system covered
most of the municipality of Trondheim, the calculation is based on
all car trips in Trondheim and not just those crossing the cordon.
From the modelled results presented in Section 4, we are provided
with data on an average travel time and an average length in
kilometres per trip. These are used to calculate the generalised
costs. Estimates for vehicle operating costs and value of travel
time is provided by the national framework for cost–beneﬁt
analysis set out in the Norwegian Public Roads Administration’s
‘‘Handbook 140—Impact assessments’’ (NPRA, 2006). As Tables 5
and 6 show the value of travel time varies from NOK 53 to NOK
198 for ordinary vehicles, depending on trip purpose, while buses
and HGVs are assumed to have value of travel time of NOK 321
and NOK 464 NOK, respectively. For vehicle operating costs,
values of NOK 1.54 per kilometre for ordinary vehicles and NOK
4.42 for heavy vehicles are used. Using this information, the
average generalised costs for car trips in the municipality of
Trondheim in 2005 and in 2006 is calculated. The calculations
indicate that the average generalised cost per car trip in
Trondheim were some NOK 53 in 2005 and NOK 47, one year
after when the tolls were removed.
The removal of the toll cordon thus resulted in a 12.4%
reduction in generalised costs when time costs are included,
while car kilometres are estimated to have increased by 7.6%. If
we assume that the increase in time costs has had no effect on
travel demand, generalised costs decreased some 30%. Table 7
presents elasticity estimates for the Trondheim toll cordon in
the order of 0.22–0.59 depending on whether we assume
motorists take time costs into account or not. This is fairly equal
to the elasticities reported in Section 2. The relatively low
elasticity values in Trondheim conﬁrm that total demand for car
travel is inelastic and that low tolls have a relatively limited
impact on total trafﬁc levels, even if tolls can make trafﬁc levels
over the day vary considerably.
The experiences from Trondheim indicate that even relatively
small price changes and low tolls can affect travel decisions.
However, it is not possible to determine with absolute certainty if
the increase in the demand for car trips is the result of the
removal of the toll cordon alone or the result of other factors. The
elasticities in Trondheim are short-run estimates. In the long-run,
travellers are able to fully adjust to new levels of generalised
costs, and higher elasticities could be expected.
Table 4
Estimated energy consumption (kWh) Trondheim municipality local transport: 2005, 2006 with tolling (2006WT) and 2006 with no tolling (2006NT).
Time of day Alternative Change
Mode 2005 2006WT 2006NT 2005 –42006WT (%) 2006WT –42006NT (%) 2005 –42006NT (%)
1 Evening–night (18–06)
Passenger car 369,503 382,358 386,394
Bus 35,959 37,281 36,983
SUM 405,462 419,638 423,377 +3.5 +0.9 +4.4
kWh/h 33,789 34,970 35,281
2 Morning (06–09)
Passenger car 223,128 232,555 246,420
Bus 20,947 21,633 21,139
SUM 244,075 254,189 267,559 +4.1 +5.3 +9.6
kWh/h 81,358 84,730 89,186
3 Mid day (09–15)
Passenger car 654,943 669,763 704,083
Bus 55,331 57 212 55,407
SUM 710,274 726,975 759,490 +2.4 +4.5 +6.9
kWh/h 118,379 121,162 126,582
4 Afternoon (15–18)
Passenger car 488,078 503,638 540,922
Bus 28,098 29,411 27,493
SUM 516,176 533,049 568,415 +3.3 +6.6 +10.1
kWh/h 172,059 177,683 189,472
Total
Passenger car 1,735,652 1,788,314 1,877,819 +3.0 +5.0 +8.2
Bus 140,336 145,537 141,021 +3.7 3.1 +0.5
SUM 1,875,987 1,933,851 2,018,840 +3.1 +4.4 +7.6
kWh/h 78,166 80,577 84,118
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6. Conclusions
This article has provided empirical results from the effects of
the removing of the Trondheim toll cordon. Trafﬁc is sensitive to
changes in tolls, and even though the average toll in Trondheim
was relatively low, there has been a considerable increase in
trafﬁc in the former charging periods. On an average, there was an
increase in trafﬁc over the previous cordon of 15.5% for the hours
between 14:00 and 18:00, whilst trafﬁc levels decreased in the
evenings and at night time. Trondheim is thus experiencing trafﬁc
growth at times when capacity constraints are already present.
The long term effects of this are likely to be more congestion and
increased environmental problems. No effects on the city centre
trade are found. This is in line with the experiences when the
cordon was introduced.
The experiences from Trondheim show that road user charging
works. Even small charges can contribute to a more efﬁcient
utilisation of the road network, as trafﬁc levels can be reduced in
the peak hours and increased in the off-peak, when time-
differentiated tolls are introduced. From the evaluation activities
related to the Trondheim RUC scheme, there is clear evidence that
a signiﬁcant proportion of the motorists has some ﬂexibility in
their trip scheduling and responds to changes in tolls through
changing their travel timing, choice of destination, route or mode.
The removal of the Trondheim toll cordon also shows that low
charges have little impact on total trafﬁc levels. There is little
evidence of motorists being ‘priced off’. As such, the Trondheim
toll cordon met objectives concerning efﬁciency, equity and
ﬁnance.
The strategic transport model for Trondheim has been used to
estimate the effects on the total transport demand in the
municipality of Trondheim. The model results suggest that the
removal of the toll cordon has caused the private car to increase
its modal share at the expense of passengers per car, public
transport and cycling/walking. According to the model, the
increase in the total number of trips would have been more
uniformly distributed among the alternatives if the toll cordon
had still been in operation.
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Table 5
Generalised costs per car trip. Trondheim municipality 2005.
Cost component Unit Share of
total trafﬁc
Value Share Average travel
time 2005
Average
kilometres
2005
Generalised costs
(excluding tolls)
Average
tolls
Share
of tolls
Generalised costs
(including tolls)
Time costs business
trips
Hours 0.923 198 0.17 15.54 10.60 8.05 8.18 7.55014 26.34
Time costs to/from
work
57 0.24 3.27
Time costs leisure trips 53 0.59 7.48
Time costs heavy
vehicles
0.077 464 0.50 4.63 0.62986 8.46
Time costs buses 321 0.50 3.20
Vehicle operating costs
ordinary vehicles
Kilometres 1.54 0.92 15.08 15.08
Vehicle operating costs
heavy vehicles
‘‘ 4.42 0.08 3.56 3.56
SUM       45.26  53.44
Table 6
Generalised costs per car trip. Trondheim municipality 2006.
Cost component Unit Share of
total trafﬁc
Value Share Average travel
time 2006
Average
kilometres
2006
Generalised costs
(excluding tolls)
Average
tolls
Share
of tolls
Generalised costs
(including tolls)
Time costs business
trips
Hours 0.923 198 0.17 16.46 10.57 8.52 0.00 19.90
Time costs to/from
work
57 0.24 3.46
Time costs leisure trips 53 0.59 7.92
Time costs heavy
vehicles
0.077 464 0.50 4.90 8.29
Time costs buses 321 0.50 3.39
Vehicle operating costs
ordinary vehicles
Kilometres 1.54 0.92 15.04 15.04
Vehicle operating costs
heavy vehicles
‘‘ 4.42 0.08 3.55 3.55
SUM      46.79  46.79
Table 7
Estimated elasticities for the Trondheim toll cordon.
Arc elasticity
Including time costs 0.59
Excluding time costs 0.22
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Abstract
Electronic ticketing in public transportation based on smart cards is gaining 
momentum worldwide. It is widely recognized that smart cards can deliver benefits to 
both passengers and operators, but due to its complexity, implementation can come at 
a considerable cost. Therefore, it is likely that a commercial appraisal from the 
perspective of the public transportation operator would reveal that costs are higher 
than benefits and hence economic non-viability. This paper presents the experiences 
of the Norwegian city of Trondheim, which has recently implemented a fully 
interoperable electronic smart card system. A social cost-benefit analysis of the 
scheme is presented, focusing on net overall benefits for the passengers, the bus 
company, the local transportation authority and the rest of society. The main 
conclusion of the paper is that the smart card ticketing system in Trondheim delivers a 
positive net present value. The paper demonstrates that an economic evaluation of 
smart card ticketing schemes using the principles of social cost-benefit analysis is 
desirable and possible. Because commercial non-viability may represent constraints 
for the implementation of such schemes, the findings presented in this paper provide 
valuable information to those currently working on smart card ticketing strategies.  
Background 
Electronic ticketing in public transportation based on smart cards is gaining 
momentum worldwide. It is widely recognized that smart cards can deliver benefits to 
passengers and public transportation operators through time savings, increased travel 
convenience, more flexible ticketing, lower administrative costs and better marketing 
information. The implementation of smart card systems is, however, a complex 
process that includes legal, economic and technological issues. Implementation can 
thus come at a considerable cost. Therefore, it is likely that a commercial appraisal 
from the perspective of the public transportation operator alone would reveal costs 
higher than benefits and hence economic non-viability. Authorities and public 
transportation operators are thus often reluctant to sanction large investments in such 
systems. 
 
A striking example of transportation investments that may not generate sufficient 
revenues to justify private investment alone is public transportation investments. 
Public transportation is often subsidized to ensure that important services are provided 
even if they do not generate sufficient ticket revenues to justify their operations. Even 
in countries where the public transportation industry is completely deregulated, there 
is usually some kind of operator reimbursement for services such as certain rural 
routes, school travel or free travel for the elderly. Other arguments for subsidizing 
public transportation include the positive externalities generated by the service, the 
potential for user-scale economics (often referred to as the Mohring effect) and the 
alleged public or merit good characteristics. This implies that, in reality, very few, if 
any, investments in public transportation are profitable from a purely commercial 
perspective. When deciding whether to implement smart card ticketing systems, we 
should hence evaluate the investment from a social perspective, following the 
principles of social cost-benefit analysis. That is the purpose of this paper. 
 
This paper presents the experiences of the Norwegian city of Trondheim, which has 
recently implemented a fully interoperable electronic smart card system. A social 
cost-benefit analysis of the scheme is presented, focusing on net overall benefits for 
the passengers, the bus company, the local transportation authority and the rest of 
society.  
 
Smart Card Ticketing in Trondheim 
The city of Trondheim (pop. 175,000), which is the third largest city in Norway, 
implemented electronic smart cards (the t:card) for its public transportation system in 
June 2008. It is a region-wide scheme in which customers can use one smart card 
based on one contract for buses, trams and regional coaches operated by ten public 
transportation operators in Trondheim and the two counties surrounding the city. The 
total population in the two counties, including Trondheim, is approximately 425,000. 
Prior to the implementation, payment was based on a wide array of paper-based 
ticketing schemes. Customers can still pay with cash, but soon after implementation, 
smart card usage accounted for approximately 70% of all payments; after nearly three 
years of operation, approximately 90% of all trips are currently paid for using the 
t:card. This means that accommodating those customers who still pay their fares by 
cash is becoming more expensive, which raises the issue of transferring to full-scale 
electronic ticketing with no option to pay by cash. Customers using the t:card are 
offered discounts from 5% to 25%, depending on prepaid amounts and other contract 
arrangements. In addition, monthly passes are offered, which gives frequent travelers 
significantly lowers fares than they would pay if purchasing single tickets. The single 
ticket cash fare in Trondheim is $5.30, while the price of a monthly pass for the 
greater Trondheim area is $100. 
 
In 2009,  of the costs of public transportation operations in Trondheim were paid for 
by ticket revenues (approximately $35 m). The remaining  was covered by local 
authority subsidies. Ten years ago, the share of subsidies to costs was close to zero, 
but that share has increased due to a freeze on fares, increased operating costs and 
increased bus frequencies. 
 
The public transportation system in Trondheim is based on 42 bus routes and one tram 
line. Trains, which are not currently part of the smart card system, carry passengers to 
and from neighboring towns. Currently, the total number of bus trips per year is 18 
million.  
 
Until recently, bus services in Trondheim were provided by a direct contract with a 
publicly owned local bus company, but they are now based on gross subsidy 
tendering, where services are planned and managed by the transit authority AtB, a 
subsidiary of Sør-Trøndelag County, where Trondheim is located. With services now 
tendered, the quality of buses and bus services is expected to increase. Beginning in 
the autumn of 2011, all services will be provided by low-floor buses, which as a 
minimum fulfill the Euro 5 guidelines for emissions. New buses will also have a rear 
access option for t:card holders. Although this option increases the risk of fraud, it is 
expected that this will also contribute to a reduced dwell time. 
 
Literature Review 
Smart cards are utilized for a number of different transportation applications, among 
which ticketing is the most widespread. However, despite being invented more than 
30 years ago, the history of smart cards is littered with a number of spectacular and 
costly failures. Regardless, the last 15 years have seen a growing number of smart 
card schemes being launched, many of which are a result of the success of large-scale 
electronic ticketing schemes in Asia (Blythe 2004). This has lead to an increased 
interest in investigations into the benefits and costs of smart card ticketing for public 
transportation.   
 
In a report by the UK Department for Transport (DfT) and Detica (2009), the net 
present value (NPV) of a national smart ticketing infrastructure over a ten-year period 
was estimated at £22.2 bn with full take-up. Even with a minimal rollout of smart 
cards, the NPV was estimated at £1.7 bn, equivalent to a Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) of 
1.8, which is close to the level considered as a high value for money (2.0). The DfT 
concluded that the installation of smart card infrastructure in UK public transportation 
has large one-off costs, but relatively low operating costs. The benefits are large and 
come from factors such as modal shifts, cost savings, increased revenue, fraud 
reduction, better service and improved access and integration with other services. It is 
worth noting that the DfT report identified real scale economies in the implementation 
of smart card technology. Although some benefits could be gained from partial 
implementation, real payback is expected once a full national interoperable scheme is 
in place.  
 
The view of large potential benefits was not, however, supported by the 
Confederation of Passenger Transport. In a Local Transport Today article published 
on November 19, 2009, they argued that the lack of smart card schemes in operation 
was not a result of market failure, but due to an unviable business case for public 
transportation operators and uncertain benefits for all parties involved. Fearnley and 
Johansen (2009) reached the same conclusion in a commercial appraisal of the Flexus 
system for public transportation in Oslo, which is struggling to implement an 
interoperable smart card system for buses, trams and metro lines in Oslo and the 
neighboring county. The new system provided a negative NPV for the operator, and 
initial assumptions have so far turned out to be overly optimistic.  
 
This is similar to the views of Iseki et al. (2008), who claimed that the benefits of 
smart card systems are often vague and that it is still unclear whether the benefits of 
smart cards outweigh the costs. More importantly, Iseki et al. identified one of the 
serious shortcomings of intelligent transport systems (ITS) and perhaps of smart card 
systems in particular: namely, the consistent lack of comprehensive economic 
evaluations to properly appraise the costs and benefits of such schemes. As argued by 
Odeck and Welde (2010), when ITS projects are not evaluated according to the same 
methodologies as traditional transportation investments, many potential ITS projects 
may lose terrain relative to alternative solutions. In addition, ITS often represent new 
applications that are still in their early stages in many countries. Ascertaining their 
expected effects is therefore often difficult. This might make traditional evaluation 
methods such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA) inappropriate. Although frameworks for 
CBA exist in most countries, these are not necessarily suitable for ITS evaluation. In 
particular, the limitations of traditional CBA for ITS evaluation are related to data 
issues, the time horizon and the valuation of user benefits. Odeck and Welde 
nevertheless concluded that evaluating ITS projects using the principles of cost-
benefit analysis is desirable and possible. Although there are costs and benefits 
associated with ITS that are difficult to monetize, most of the benefits and costs of 
ITS schemes, such as electronic payment systems, are measurable in monetary terms 
and are therefore suitable for CBA. 
 
One of the very few economic appraisals of smart card technologies was presented by 
Cheung (2006), who analyzed the effects of the Dutch national smart card system. 
Although not necessarily providing benefits to each of the individual operators 
involved, the analysis indicated that the project has resulted in large cumulative 
benefits, with a BCR on the order of 0.2-0.5. The most important direct benefit for 
passengers was the amount of time spent purchasing tickets, while operators have 
benefited from reduced fraud and increased opportunities for more sophisticated price 
differentiation. 
 
Framework for Evaluation 
In this article, the evaluation of the smart card system in Trondheim is based on social 
cost-benefit analysis. Social CBA differs from commercial appraisal in that all costs 
and benefits associated with a particular scheme are included regardless of to whom 
they accrue. This means that a scheme that involves direct revenues and turns out to 
be non-viable from a commercial perspective may still be desirable from a social 
perspective when all external benefits and costs are included.  
 
The implementation of an interoperable smart card system in Trondheim was 
motivated by potential benefits for all parties involved and affected by public 
transportation in Trondheim: passengers, operators, local authorities and the wider 
community. Table 1 outlines the expected impacts for all of the affected groups.  
 
Table 1: Benefits and costs – affected groups. 
Passengers PT operators Local authorities Wider community 
Time savings Time savings Improved statistics Cost of taxation 
Reduced delays Increased reliability Project costs Reduced emissions 
Less need to carry cash Project and investment costs   
  Operating costs     
+ +/- -/+ -/+ 
 
The introduction of smart cards in public transportation reduces the time spent 
boarding and paying, provided that payment is done when boarding. This constitutes a 
time saving for each passenger. Although this may be a small and potentially 
negligible time saving for the individual, normally not more than a few seconds, it is 
important to note that the individual passenger will save time at every stop and for 
every foregoing passenger who would have previously paid by cash. Over the course 
of an average bus or tram journey, this could constitute a significant time saving for 
both the passengers and the operator(s). This is similar to the user-scale economies 
identified by Mohring (1972), where the presence of an additional user increases the 
likelihood of additional services being provided due to time savings and the resulting 
increased demand. This is also similar to benefits arising from measures to improve 
accessibility to passengers with special needs, often referred to as ‘universal design’ 
(UD). The conventional thinking is that UD is for the few, i.e., the impaired, and 
given that they are few in numbers, UD projects will generally be unprofitable from a 
socioeconomic point of view because benefits will be low while investment costs will 
be high. However, a recent study has shown that UD projects benefit all users of the 
facility, whether impaired or not, and the additional costs of implementation are 
generally low; hence, their NPVs are high and positive (Odeck et al. 2010). 
 
Smart cards often also increase bus route reliability and reduce delays for passengers. 
Payment by cash can be a complex process, where the average time per passenger 
varies from a few seconds to over a minute. This makes scheduling difficult. The 
introduction of smart cards normally reduces this pay time variability and hence 
contributes to both reduced delays and increased reliability.  
 
Another benefit for passengers and operators is a reduced need for cash. Today, 
people are increasingly carrying no cash at all, and the percentage of transactions 
made by credit and debit cards is increasing annually. In 2009, there were 1.2 bn card 
transactions in Norway (up 10% from 2008). This is equivalent to 246 transactions 
per person (Norges Bank 2010). Norges Bank, Norway’s central bank, has estimated 
that cash only settles about 23% of transactions at the point of sale, representing 14 to 
38% of the value of all sales. The ratio of the cash stock to GDP in Norway has fallen 
over the past decades and has fallen considerably faster in Norway than in the other 
Nordic countries (Gresvik and Haare 2008). 
 
It is expected that smart cards, at least initially, increase operating costs for the 
operators involved. These, along with project and investment costs, which are shared 
with local authorities, represent the direct costs of implementing the smart card 
system. In addition, costs financed by the public sector through taxation should be 
multiplied by 1.20, which is the standard marginal cost of public funds in Norway, 
reflecting the fact that distortive taxes lower welfare by more than they collect in 
revenue. 
 
Finally, smart card systems normally provide local authorities with better public 
transportation statistics and ease the planning and scheduling of services. In addition, 
operators may benefit from additional information on customers’ trips, paving the 
way for loyalty schemes and a better understanding of customers’ needs and journey 
patterns (Davis 2002, in Blythe 2004). It is also not unreasonable to believe that, as 
smart cards reduce dwell time, local emissions could be reduced. This will benefit the 
wider community. 
 
From the above, we notice that most of the envisaged effects can be measured in 
monetary terms, and an economic assessment can be done. In CBA, the relevant 
investment criteria are the NPV and the BCR. The NPV can be expressed as follows: 
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Here, B and C represent benefits and costs, r represents the discount rate, and t 
represents the time period. The NPV determines the absolute economic merit of a 
project. If its value is greater than zero, it means that the project generates benefits 
that are greater than its cost and is therefore profitable from an economic point view.  
 
The BCR is a value for money measurement and is different from the NPV. It is 
defined as the ratio of the net benefits of a project to its costs. Formally, the BCR is 
written as:  
 
C
NPVBCR            (2) 
 
The BCR has a simple interpretation, making it useful for policy makers to judge the 
worthiness of projects in terms of returns per euro invested. If the ratio is, for 
example, 0.2, it means that the returns are 20%, or a 20-cent profit for every dollar 
invested in the project.  
 
In practice, we use the NPV to determine whether a project is profitable from an 
economic point of view. If the aim is to rank ITS projects among themselves or 
against other projects, then the BCR should be used, because it shows which projects 
give the greatest returns per dollar invested. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data
The data for the analysis were collected in cooperation with AtB, the body responsible 
for Trondheim’s public transportation system. Stensrud and Kuipers (2008) provided 
a comprehensive overview of all costs associated with the smart card system. 
Although it was implemented in 2008, the process leading up to implementation was 
an arduous and prolonged affair. The planning started in the early 1990s, but because 
implementation turned out to be more complex than was first assumed, it was 
postponed several times. The process even resulted in a court case with the equipment 
supplier, which ended in a settlement in 2007. After the settlement, the project was 
restarted and reorganized. Therefore, as the project contents and organization have 
been so different, the project can be split into two phases: before and after the court 
settlement in 2007. In this paper, we use the costs after 2007 as the basis for the 
analysis. The analysis only covers the city of Trondheim and not those neighboring 
regions where the t:card can also be used.  
 
Time savings usually constitute the largest share of estimated benefits of 
transportation projects, and the estimation of time saved per passenger therefore 
requires careful calculation. The estimated time saving of 6.8 seconds, as shown in 
Table 2, for each boarding passenger using a smart card is based on registrations 
performed by students at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology during 
the spring of 2009. The means are based on a sample of 900 observations. 
Unfortunately, this was done almost a year after implementation, and we cannot rule 
out the possibility that those still opting for cash payment at this stage represent the 
slower payers. The time savings may thus be underestimated. As Table 2 shows, even 
smart card transactions take time, but cash is more time-consuming and, above all, 
involves more variability in time spent per passenger, which makes scheduling more 
difficult. 
 
Table 2: Time in seconds spent on cash payment vs. smart card payment. 
  Cash transactions Smart card transactions 
No. of cases 436 466 
Mean 8.3 1.5 
St.dev. 6.5 1.8 
Minimum 2 1 
Maximum 47 18 
 
The analysis is based on measured data after 12-24 months of operation. In addition to 
time savings, the data are composed of investment and operating costs, reinvestment 
costs, project costs, bus trips, t:card shares, load factors and standard national values 
for the value of time and discount rates. The appraisal period is 10 years. This is 
considerably shorter than what is used for traditional transportation expenditures, 
which are appraised over a 25-year period. A 10-year appraisal period reflects the 
uncertainty associated with technology investment and ensures a conservative 
approach to the analysis. The main parameters used in the estimation are listed in 
Table 3. The values are listed in Norwegian Kroner (1 NOK  $0.18). 
 
Table 3: Overall assumptions for estimation. 
Parameter Value
Investment costs 13.000.000 
Operating costs per year 4.900.000 
Annual service and maintenance costs 1.100.000 
Reinvestment costs (every three years) 7.500.000 
Project costs 7.800.000 
Total number of bus trips per year 17.300.000 
Share of trips performed with the t:card 70% in 2008, 80% in 2009, 90% thereafter 
Annual increase in the number of bus trips 2.5% 
Average time saving per t:card transaction 6.8 seconds 
Average load factor 20 
Time value for bus passengers 68 NOK/hour 
Time value for bus company 356 NOK/hour 
Discount rate 4.5% 
Appraisal period 10 years 
Marginal cost of public funds 20% 
 
Methodology
The average time saving per passenger is estimated to be 6.8 seconds for each time a 
boarding passenger uses a smart card instead of paying by cash. Notice that this does 
not mean that each smart card transaction represents a time saving. The previous 
paper-based ticketing arrangements also included monthly passes, which holders 
would simply display to the bus driver. This proportion of users would not generate 
time savings when switching to the t:card. 
 
This means that the total gross time savings t per year, measured in hours for 
passengers using smart cards, can be expressed as follows: 
 
3600
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where  is the total number of passengers using smart cards per year, and  
denotes the average time savings per smart card transaction. 
cardtP: sectk
 
The net annual time savings for all passengers is hence expressed as: 
 
)1()(( :: mBPTTT ttt cardtcardttot        (4) 
 
Here, the time saving for smart card users is adjusted for m, the proportion of users 
with monthly passes in the last year before smart card implementation. In addition, the 
equation includes time savings for passengers already on the bus, BP. These 
passengers will also save time at each bus stop whenever a boarding passenger uses a 
smart card. 
 
The annual value of time savings can then easily expressed as: 
 
)()( : bcardtpttott wTwTB t         (5) 
 Here,  and  express the value of travel time savings for bus passengers and the 
bus company, respectively. 
pw bw
 
By including investment costs and operating costs and inserting  into Equation (1), 
we are able to calculate the NPV of the smart card ticketing system in Trondheim.  
tB
 
Results
Based on the data and methodology presented above, a cost-benefit analysis was 
performed. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Cost-benefit analysis of the smart card system in Trondheim. 
 NPV costs NPV benefits NPV 
Investment costs (13.000.000)   
Project costs (7.800.000)   
Operating and reinvestment costs (64.700.000)   
Marginal cost of public funds (4.200.000)   
Time savings of bus passengers  177.400.000  
Time savings of bus company  88.100.000  
NPV (89.700.000) 265.500.000 175.800.000 
BCR 1.96 
 
The smart card ticketing system in Trondheim is profitable from a socioeconomic 
point of view, with an NPV of 175.8 m NOK or approximately $30.8 m. This equals a 
BCR of 1.96, meaning that $1 spent on the t:card system generates benefits of $2.96. 
This is also substantially more than what is usually provided through traditional 
transportation expenditure, which, in the Norwegian case, may struggle to deliver a 
positive NPV at all.  
 
The implementation of smart card ticketing is a complex process, involving a number 
of actors and requiring readjustments for both operators and passengers. It often takes 
time before all challenges are overcome and before all benefits can be realized. The 
long-term objective should, in our opinion, be to abolish cash payment completely. 
This will increase the social surplus further. In time, it should also be a realistic 
objective to reduce the costs of operating the system. The first years of a new 
ticketing system often have a high number of customer inquiries, but as users become 
familiar with the system and take advantage of more efficient ways to manage their 
contracts, savings could be realized. It is also worth noting that conservative estimates 
were used throughout the analysis. It is likely that the NPV of Trondheim’s smart card 
system is higher than that estimated above.  
 
There are also a number of benefits that are not monetized and included in the 
analysis. One such benefit is the reduced need for cash. For bus drivers, large amounts 
of cash pose a security risk. During the last five years, there have been several 
robberies and attempted robberies on buses in Trondheim, and the union representing 
the drivers has suggested a complete removal of all cash on board the buses. In 
Sweden, work to remove cash from buses is in progress in several cities (Rathe 2008), 
and the t:card could therefore be a step in the direction of cashless public 
transportation in Trondheim. 
 
Another non-monetized benefit is the improved quality of public transportation 
statistics. Accurate travel information is important for transportation research, policy 
analysis and planning. Previous paper-based systems have failed to provide planners 
with necessary information. Statistics are incomplete and consist of a limited set of 
information needed for analysis and planning. Previously, the bus company in 
Trondheim, which was responsible for collecting the data, even failed to provide 
information on the development in the number of bus passengers from one year to the 
next. The introduction of smart cards has improved this situation, and now detailed 
statistics on the number of trips per bus service, including time of day and day of 
week, is available. It is expected that this information could be used to improve the 
quality of public transportation in Trondheim. 
 
Trondheim’s smart card system generates substantial time savings for both passengers 
and operators. Let us take a five-kilometer bus service with 10 stops as an example. 
At an average speed of 15 kilometers per hour, the trip will take 19 minutes and 48 
seconds. If, at each stop, two of the passengers boarding are previous cash payers, this 
will generate a total time savings of two minutes. Depending on where passengers 
board along the route, this could constitute a time savings of up to 10%. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that this time savings could increase the demand for public 
transportation. Rødseth and Bang (2006) used a travel time elasticity of 0.26, 
whereas Balcombe et al. (2004) reported long-run travel time elasticities between 
0.38 and 0.69. This means that a 10% reduction in travel time along a bus route 
could generate passenger growth on the order of 3 to 7%. Introducing smart cards and 
increasing the efficiency of ticketing could hence be efficient tools in increasing the 
demand for public transportation and promoting a modal shift away from private cars.  
 Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the smart card ticketing system in Trondheim 
delivers a positive net present value. For bus passengers, the main benefit lies in time 
savings during boarding and a reduced dwell time. Although these represent only a 
small time savings for the individual, all passengers already on the bus will save time 
at every stop when passengers pay using smart cards, so the total time savings due to 
the t:card could be considerable over the course of a bus trip. This is an example of 
user-scale economics. Further passenger benefits include increased timetable 
reliability and a reduced need for cash. The bus company benefits from reduced 
delays and increased reliability because of the shorter time spent at bus stops. This 
could allow the bus company to reduce the number of buses needed or increase the 
service level to passengers.  
 
This paper has demonstrated that an economic evaluation of smart card ticketing 
schemes using the principles of social cost-benefit analysis is desirable and possible. 
Even if all effects are not monetized and included in the analysis, the main costs and 
benefits are, and because the non-included non-monetized effects mostly would have 
increased the net benefits of the scheme, we consider the analysis to be robust and, if 
anything, to err on the pessimistic side. Because commercial non-viability often 
constrains the implementation of smart card schemes, these findings provide valuable 
information to those currently working on smart card ticketing strategies.  
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